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Very few public-health interventions have been as successful as immunizations in 
preventing untimely deaths. Over the past thirty-five years, vaccines have provided 
substantial and highly cost-effective improvements to human health, particularly to 
that of children. As immunization systems mature, immunization safety has become 
pivotal in determining the success or failure of national vaccine-preventable disease 
control programmes.
Although hundreds of millions of doses of vaccine are used every year in developing 
countries, assessments of regulatory authorities, conducted by WHO, demonstrate that 
few of the developing countries’ programmes have the ability to monitor and assure the 
safe use of vaccines. Now more than ever, it is clear that vaccine safety issues are not 
merely a developing or developed country phenomenon, but a global phenomenon. 
WHO has therefore proposed developing a blueprint for a global, regional and country 
level vaccine safety assessment and response system.
This initial step of the global vaccine safety blueprint project included a set of studies that 
analysed the existing vaccine safety infrastructure in low-income countries. These studies 
have provided the foundations for the development of a strategic plan that defines the 
indicators of a minimal capacity for ensuring vaccine safety, and proposes a concerted 
approach to enhance global vaccine safety activities, with a focus on national capacity 
in the world's poorest countries up to the minimal capacity. In addition, the blueprint 
includes an illustrative workplan with a budget and management principles.
This report summarizes the findings of seven detailed studies conducted during the first 
phase of the global vaccine safety blueprint project. The studies provided the empirical 
basis for developing the blueprint strategies and work planning, and are referenced 
throughout the blueprint documents. Three stakeholder surveys (vaccine safety experts, 
industry and regulators), three systems analyses (national regulatory functions for 
post-marketing surveillance of vaccine adverse events, vaccine pharmacovigilance 
infrastructure in a sample of low- and middle-income countries, and existing 
international vaccine safety initiatives) and one financial analysis are presented here.
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Executive summary
WHO is developing a global vaccine safety blueprint to improve existing vaccine safety 
systems in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC). In preparation for the blueprint, 
information on the perception of vaccine safety experts about the performance of 
vaccine safety systems in LMIC, as well as their expectations and recommendations, 
was sought.
To outline local experience, available infrastructures, needs and priorities of vaccine 
safety monitoring expressed in LMIC, we performed a survey of vaccine safety 
stakeholders with different professional backgrounds in LMIC. Experts were randomly 
sampled by country economic status, WHO region and population size. Their relevant 
perspectives were elicited via questionnaire by four scientific areas of vaccine safety 
monitoring. Follow-up clarifications were implemented when appropriate.
Of the 182 professionals who initially agreed to participate, 78 (43%) coming from 
28 LMIC, returned the survey. Of these, 89% coming from 26 LMIC, expressed the 
need to improve the capacity and quality of vaccine safety monitoring in their countries. 
The main needs expressed were support for training (80% from 27 LMIC) and 
harmonized methods, including standardized case definitions (74% from 26 LMIC). 
Eighty-two percent of professionals coming from 24 countries report to have 
spontaneous reporting systems. Of these, 52% coming from 20 countries, indicate actual 
detection of reports. Fifty-six percent, coming from 19 countries, indicated the existence 
of at least basic health databases. However, only 15%, coming from six countries, 
reported conducting epidemiological studies using these resources. Forty-five percent, 
coming from 14 countries, wish to achieve the ability to link health-care databases. 
Forty-five percent, coming from 18 countries, indicate that they are partially relying 
on vaccine safety information from other countries. Thirty percent, coming from 
15 countries, requested improved international collaboration and, as high as 93%, coming 
from 26 LMIC, expressed the need for support from an international consortium. 
Ensuring the safety of vaccines is considered important by public-health experts from 
LMIC. There is a need to improve the quality of existing vaccine safety data, to enhance 
local analytic capacity, to establish health-care databases and to enhance information 
sharing within and across countries. This could best be accomplished through a 
concerted effort to provide training and harmonized tools, and an international support 
structure, so that countries can perform vaccine safety functions effectively. 
The capacity and needs of 
post-marketing vaccine safety 
monitoring in Low- and Middle-
Income Countries (LMIC)
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1. Background
Hundreds of million of doses of vaccine are used every year in developing countries. 
Many vaccine products are now either primarily licensed in, or developed for, 
exclusive use in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC). However, 65% of 
WHO Member States, including the majority of LMIC, do not have a functional 
post-marketing monitoring system to monitor and assure a safer use of vaccines. 
Safety issues have derailed local vaccine programmes. It is essential that these countries 
have the capacity to detect, investigate and respond to vaccine safety concerns. 
The resources and expertise needed to establish such systems locally, and globally, 
are limited. It is essential to discern where to prioritize and how to federate global 
resources to improve functional vaccine safety monitoring, investigation and response 
systems, particularly in LMIC. To address these needs, WHO is developing a global 
blueprint to describe strategic plans, budget and funding options and governance 
principles of an integrated vaccine safety consortium. In preparation for the WHO 
blueprint, information is needed on local capacity and the needs of post-marketing 
vaccine safety monitoring in LMIC. 
2. Objectives
These are, to outline local experience, strategies, needs and priorities of vaccine safety 
monitoring in LMIC. 
3. Methods
3.1 Study design and population
A standardized survey was designed and implemented among vaccine safety experts 
with different professional backgrounds in LMIC, to draw out their perception, 
expectations or recommendations regarding vaccine safety monitoring systems in their 
particular countries.
To ensure the representativeness of the sample and reduce selection bias, we randomly 
selected one country from each cluster stratified by WHO geographic regions 
(AFR, AMR, SEAR, EUR, EMR, WPR), country economic status classified by 
the World Bank in 2010 (low income, lower middle income) and population size 
(≤10, ≤100, >100 million). Twenty-seven countries were identified based on random 
sampling (See Appendix I). At the time of the closing date for data collection, we had 
received completed surveys from 20 of the countries selected. In this report, we have 
therefore included data from an additional nine LMIC in which qualified participants 
were able to be contacted.
Within each country, we have tried to identify at least one representative from 
five different professional backgrounds: regulatory authority; public health; academia 
and patient care; health consumer representative, and manufacturer, where available. 
Participants were identified through a WHO contact list of national regulatory 
authorities (NRA) and lists were provided by the blueprint collaborative group or 
WHO regional offices, the Brighton Collaboration (BC) member list, recommendations 
from Brighton Collaboration members, PubMed and extensive internet search, or 
recommendations from local professionals. Recruitment of qualified LMIC stakeholders 
was done by email invitations, plus phone calls where necessary. 
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3.2 Questionnaire development 
A structured survey was developed which established an international initiatives 
inventory, assessing local/national available infrastructures and previous experience, 
development plans and needs for each of the four areas of vaccine safety monitoring: 
(1) concern detection; (2) concern verification; (3) causality assessment; (4) risk 
communication (See Appendix II). The questions were either structured or open 
questions. The questionnaire was tested in three countries not participating in the 
main study (Brazil, Ghana and South Africa). The questionnaire was then revised 
according to comments from the consultative group review and preliminary analyses 
of the pilot testing. The final version of the questionnaire was then translated from 
English into six other languages, including Arabic, Chinese, French, Portuguese, 
Russian and Spanish.
3.3 Data analysis
Participants referring to pre-licensure concerns in their responses were excluded 
from primary analysis. Descriptive analyses were done with IBM SPSS software 
(version 19.0, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Free texts were interpreted and classified into 
categories. Interesting and residual findings from open questions that could not be 
grouped into categories are instead described in the results and discussion. Results were 
stratified by co-variables, such as economic status, when appropriate. 
4. Results
4.1 Description of study participants 
Five hundred and fifty-eight professionals from 70 countries were screened as 
potential survey participants; 182 of them from 47 countries were sent a questionnaire, 
and 78 from 28 countries responded. Seventy-seven of the 78 returned surveys 
were included in the primary analyses. Thirty-eight percent of the professionals 
are from 11 low-income countries, while 62% are from 17 low to middle-income 
countries. Professional background distributions include regulatory authority (18%), 
public-health organizations (47%), academia or patient care (27%), manufacturers (6%) 
and health consumer representatives (3%). This distribution would seem to reflect the 
underlying distribution of organizations involved with vaccine safety in LMIC.
4.2 Consistent pattern of “available infrastructure – lacking experience – 
needs for improvement”
Across the areas of concern detection, verification and investigation, high proportions 
of professionals indicated at least one available element of infrastructure (95%, 88%, 
82%, respectively), while much lower proportions of them indicated actual experience 
(67%, 56%, 51%, respectively). The consistent mismatch of perceived available 
infrastructure and experience may suggest suboptimal utilization of existing systems. 
This may be explained by the relatively recent attention to developing vaccine safety 
systems. Hence, infrastructure is starting to be put in place, but there is still limited 
experience. Furthermore, system development is ongoing and extensive needs are 
highlighted in all areas, thus indicating an intention to improve the current situation 
(Figure 1, Table 1). Overall, risk communication is the most underdeveloped area. 
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Figure 1: Perceived available infrastructure, previous experience,  
ongoing development and further needs, by area of activity
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Stratification by country economic status shows that the mismatch between available 
infrastructure and experience for concern detection exists mainly in low-income 
countries (LIC) with 85% professionals coming from 10 LIC versus 44% coming from 
five LIC. In addition, countries with a higher income level were more likely to detect 
concerns than countries with a lower income level (80% professionals coming from 
17 low- middle-income countries versus 44% from five LIC) (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Perceived infrastructure and experience in detection of  
vaccine safety concerns by country economic status
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50
100
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Infrastructure % Experience %
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Although 56% of professionals, coming from 19 countries, indicated the existence of 
at least basic health-care databases, only 15%, coming from six countries, reported 
conducting epidemiological studies using these resources (Table 1).
Table 1: Comparisons of perceived infrastructure,  
experience and overall needs for selected items
Pertinent area
% professional (from no. of countries)
Infrastructure Experience Overall needs‡
Spontaneous reporting Detection 82% (24) 52% (20) 78% (25)
Standardized case definition Verification 70% (24) 33% (14) 74% (26)
Expert committee Verification 66% (22) 33% (13) 64% (23)
Immunization records Verification 60% (19) 29% (9) 63% (22)
Health-care database Investigation 56% (19) 15% (6)* 49% (22)
Media tracking Detection 53% (17) 14% (5) 52% (17)
Observed versus expected analyses Verification 38% (13) 15% (6) 37% (14)
* Experience in using epidemiologic studies to investigate associations of vaccine safety concerns 
was compared with health-care databases available.
‡ Overall expressed needs was calculated for individuals: “yes” to the same item in either “existing 
programme” and “further needs” was counted as “yes” to the corresponding item in “overall 
expressed needs”.
Sixty-seven percent of professionals, coming from 23 countries, stated experience in 
concern detection. Concern investigation was based on case review by 51% of experts, 
coming from 18 countries. Conduction of epidemiological studies has only been 
indicated by 15% of professionals, coming from six countries (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Experience with concern detection and investigation  
by method in LMIC (percentage of professionals)
67
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50
100
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4.3 Major expressed needs and capacity to be achieved
As shown in Table 2, the major needs expressed include: training; harmonized tools 
or methods, such as standardized case definitions; expert committee; capacity of data 
analysis and interpretation; vaccine registry; health-care databases; accessibility to 
medical source and immunization data, and improving perception and beliefs of vaccine 
safety.
When asked about the local minimal capacity to be achieved, the improved ability to link 
health-care databases was cited by 45%, coming from 14 countries. Improved ability 
to validate vaccine safety reports was also cited as desirable by 36% of professionals, 
coming from 14 countries (Table 2). 
Risk communication is the least developed area. Fifty percent of the professionals 
indicated infrastructure availability and 44% of them stated previous experience 
(Figure 1). As many as 78% of professionals, from 25 countries, cited an overall need 
for training in this area (Table 2).
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Table 2: Ongoing development and overall needs by  
the four scientific areas (selected items)
% professional  
(from no. of countries)
Ongoing 
development Overall needs
‡
Concern detection
Training 62% (20) 80% (23)
Spontaneous reporting 67% (24) 78% (25)
Stimulated reporting 51% (20) 59% (24)
Health database analyses 47% (18) 55% (19)
Media tracking 47% (17) 52% (18)
Perception and beliefs 27% (13) 45% (18)
Reports from other countries 38% (17) 40% (17)
Concern verification
Training 62% (22) 80% (27)
Standardized case definitions 63% (24) 74% (26)
Experts committee 64% (23) 73% (24)
Immunization records 56% (21) 63% (22)
Access to medical source and immunization data 43% (17) 48% (19)
Observed versus expected analyses 32% (15) 37% (15)
Concern investigation (causality assessment)
Training 53% (20) 78% (27)
Experts and knowledge 45% (18) 63% (23)
Capacity of data analysis and interpretation 41% (17) 56% (22)
Vaccine registry 41% (19) 53% (21)
Health-care databases 43% (21) 49% (22)
Regular quality control 36% (17) 47% (21)
Collaboration with other countries 21% (12) 30% (15)
Regional data sharing/accessibility 21% (9) 27% (12)
Risk communication
Training 59% (21) 78% (25)
Health-care provider 60% (20) 69% (22)
Media 51% (19) 63% (22)
Public-health authority 52% (20) 63% (22)
Legal framework 23% (15) 38% (18)
Preferred minimal capacity 
Ability to link health-care databases — 45% (14)
Ability to validate vaccine safety reports — 36% (14)
Epidemiological studies — 34% (11)
‡  Overall expressed needs were calculated for individuals: “yes” to the same item in either “existing 
programme” and “further needs” was counted as “yes” to the corresponding item in “overall 
expressed needs”.
4.4 Need for international support
When describing elements of available infrastructures, 45% of professionals, 
coming from 18 countries, indicate that their countries rely partially on vaccine 
safety information from other countries (data not shown), and 30% of professionals, 
coming from 15 countries, wish to improve collaboration with other countries (Table 2). 
International support is needed for all scientific areas, emphasizing the need for training, 
particularly for concern investigation and risk communication (Figure 4, Table 2).
Global vaccine safety blueprint - The landscape analysis8
Figure 4: Perceived needs from international consortium,  
by area of activity
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5. Discussion
This study was performed to assess the available capacity and expressed needs of vaccine 
safety monitoring in LMIC. It provides the most up-to-date summary of current 
opinions and expressed needs from a comprehensive sample of LMIC. 
5.1 Importance of improving vaccine safety monitoring
Vaccine safety is of great concern in LMIC. The majority of professionals (96%) 
do not consider the current capacity to meet the needs in any of the four areas. 
This is particularly true for the functional aspects of the available infrastructure. 
Therefore, we suggest developing and implementing training modules for all areas 
of vaccine safety assessment, focussing on utilization of available infrastructure and 
building up of pharmacoepidemiologic capacity. 
Most experts want to move beyond spontaneous reporting towards comprehensive 
systems to detect, verify, investigate and respond to vaccine safety concerns. 
In particular, methods for active surveillance (59%) based on health databases (55%) 
and guidance documents, are needed in the area of detection. For case verification, 
standardized case definition for outcomes (74%) and immunization records for exposure 
(63%), as well as expert committees for evaluation (73%), are needed. The main needs 
expressed for concern investigation, apart from training, include establishment of 
vaccine registries and secondary use of medical records in health databases. For risk 
communication, improvements should focus on public-health authorities (63%) utilizing 
public media (63%), and health-care providers (69%) listening to, and informing, 
their communities. 
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It is also important to regularly evaluate national capacity, especially the functional 
aspects of vaccine safety monitoring, in all four areas. This includes determination 
of criteria useful for evaluation of the investigational performance at national and 
international level. For example, the ability to detect concerns can be evaluated in several 
ways. An approach suggested would be to view detection systems as diagnostic tests, 
and to evaluate them according to generally-accepted test performance parameters, 
including sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value (PPV), negative predictive 
value (NPV), accuracy, and precision. This could be achieved by determining vaccine-
event pairs, with true positive and true negative associations, as a benchmark.
5.2 Current infrastructure and functionality
Looking at structural elements alone, a high proportion of professionals indicated the 
readiness of their countries in monitoring the safety of vaccines. However, the consistent 
pattern of available infrastructure, lack of experience and common requirements for 
improvement, suggests that available infrastructures are less functional than desired. 
This may be explained by the relatively recent attention to developing vaccine safety 
systems. Thus, infrastructure is starting to be put in place, but there is still limited 
experience. Acquiring the experience necessary will undoubtedly require initial external 
support. The unequal ability to detect, investigate and respond to concerns in poor 
countries, also highlights the need to actively strengthen these countries according to 
a set of criteria for a minimal functional capacity.
5.3 Harmonized terminology and tools 
The review of the responses received highlights the lack of a common language 
and also understanding of current concepts of vaccine safety monitoring in LMIC. 
For example, in the perception of experts there is a surprisingly high availability of 
advanced infrastructures, such as, to conduct active surveillance for concern detection, 
standard definition for case verification, vaccine registry and health-care databases. 
In addition to being an expression of the awareness of resources available potentially 
useful for vaccine safety monitoring, this is most likely due to different interpretations 
of terminologies. Another example is concern verification, which is reported by 56% 
professionals, from 22 countries, that have ever detected a concern, but only 33% 
professionals indicated the use of standardized case definitions. This implies that 
there might be differing concepts of case verification. This is further highlighted by 
the infrastructure reported from most professionals available for causality assessment. 
However, the assessment method reported is case-based causality assessment by 
experts. This is a process relying on the results of epidemiologic studies investigating 
associations, and mechanistic studies investigating the pathophysiology. Such studies 
appear to be only conducted in few countries; hence, there is a need for standardized 
terms and definitions and harmonized approaches shared by everyone contributing to 
a globally integrated vaccine safety monitoring system.
5.4 Information sharing and risk communication
Timely availability of pertinent data is an important characteristic of effective surveillance 
systems. Information sharing or data accessibility is critical for timely verification and 
causality assessment of vaccine safety concerns. There is a need for national legislation, 
and its effective implementation, to facilitate access to health-care databases and 
information from medical records for urgent public-health investigations. 
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Risk communication is among the weakest areas of vaccine safety monitoring in 
LMIC, both between agencies, and to the public. Professionals claim that availability 
of communication strategies is passively reacting to public questioning, at best. Given 
that 95% of professionals, from 23 countries, reported concern detection, and 82% 
professionals, from 20 countries, reported a negative impact on the immunization 
programmes and public confidence in immunization (data not shown), communication 
is an area which is in major need of improvement. It is of paramount importance to 
strengthen communication mechanisms in countries where the incidence of wild-type 
disease is high, and a decrease in the coverage rate based on insufficient monitoring 
and response systems poses an avoidable direct health risk to large parts of the 
population.
5.5 International support structure 
The need for international support is expressed by the majority of professionals, 
93% from 26 LMIC. The main needs identified are training, sharing of information, 
data, knowledge and technical support. 
As a starting point for improving international collaboration, it is important to build 
consensus on a shared set of terms, concepts, definitions, guidelines, protocols and codes 
of conduct. Appropriate methodological and technical infrastructure and support for 
standardized data sharing and hypothesis testing at the global level is required. 
The modes of interaction between national systems and a supranational infrastructure 
have to be established. Regular knowledge transfer and training would largely have to 
be coordinated and provided by regional or international organizations. For countries 
contributing to the global monitoring system, specialized support should be provided 
by rapid response teams. 
5.6 Limitations 
The main limitations of the study are the relatively small sample size, and possible 
information bias. Although the study randomly sampled experts to be contacted, 
engaging professionals who are in key positions in vaccine safety, and from different 
professions, in all countries to equal proportions, was a major challenge in this first 
attempt. Many professionals declined participation due to time constraints. In addition, 
different understandings of some questions could have partly resulted from country 
differences in use of terminology, or in culture, knowledge and experience. 
6. Conclusions
There is a need expressed by LMIC experts to enhance vaccine safety monitoring, 
to improve verification of concerns based on international standards, to improve 
the infrastructure and analytical capacity for investigation of concerns, to promote 
information sharing between national organizations and across countries, to establish 
mechanisms and methods for risk communication and to establish training programmes 
and shared tools. These needs could best be accomplished through concerted effort 
and an international support structure so that countries can effectively perform vaccine 
safety functions. Follow-up studies are proposed to characterize specific baseline needs 
and to monitor progress made.
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Appendix I : 
Cluster sampling of LMIC
Region Sampling
LMIC
Low Income
Low population Middle population Large population
AFR
Selected Gambia Kenya NA
All in the cluster
Benin, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Comoro,; Eritrea, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo
Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Niger, Senegal, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda
NA
AMR Selected NA Haiti NAAll in the cluster NA Haiti NA
EMR Selected Somalia Yemen NAAll in the cluster Somalia Afghanistan, Yemen NA
EUR Selected Tajikistan Uzbekistan NAAll in the cluster Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Uzbekistan NA
SEAR
Selected NA Nepal Bangladesh
All in the cluster NA Myanmar, Nepal, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Bangladesh
WPR Selected Lao People’s Democratic Republic Viet Nam NAAll in the cluster Lao People’s Democratic Republic Cambodia, Viet Nam NA
Region Sampling
Lower-middle income
Low population Middle population Large population
AFR
Selected Lesotho Angola Nigeria
All in the cluster Cape Verde, Congo, Lesotho, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland
Angola, Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire Nigeria
AMR
Selected Paraguay Ecuador NA
All in the cluster Belize, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay Ecuador, Guatemala NA
EMR
Selected Jordan Egypt Pakistan
All in the cluster Djibouti, Jordan
Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic 
of), Iraq, Morocco, Sudan, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia
Pakistan
EUR
Selected Georgia Ukraine NA
All in the cluster
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kosovo, Republic of 
Moldova, Turkmenistan 
Ukraine NA
SEAR Selected Maldives Sri Lanka IndiaAll in the cluster Bhutan, Maldives, Timor-Leste Sri Lanka, Thailand India, Indonesia
WPR
Selected Mongolia Philippines China
All in the cluster
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia 
(Federated States of), Mongolia, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu
Philippines China
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Concern detection (i.e. signal detection, signal generation) is defined as any genuine 
or alleged professional or public questioning related to the safety of a given vaccine or 
its associated programme. Passive surveillance is the collection of spontaneous adverse 
event following immunization (AEFI) reports, on a case-by-case basis, by medical care 
providers or laboratories for the local or national health agency. Active surveillance is 
the regular or proactive solicitation of adverse event reports, on a case-by-case basis, 
from health-care providers or facilities, for example, by regular distribution of reporting 
cards and active follow-up by a dedicated investigator.
Concern verification (i.e. signal strengthening) is the process to verify and strengthen a 
detected vaccine safety concern. It includes the act of verifying the relevant exposures 
and the outcome(s), as well as their known interactions.
Causality assessment (i.e. hypothesis testing, association studies, signal verification) is 
done by controlled epidemiologic studies to accept or reject a given null hypothesis. 
Hypothesis testing is different from causality assessment, which describes the process 
of determining etiologic and pathophysiologic evidence, for an event caused by 
immunization. This may be done on a case-by-case basis to make immediate decisions 
concerning the medical management. However, to generalize a causal relationship 
between immunization and a given health event, carefully designed epidemiological 
or laboratory experimental studies elucidating the aetiology and pathophysiologic 
mechanisms are required. Due to the different understanding of “causality assessment” 
reflected by the returned surveys, the term “concern investigation” is used to replace 
“causality assessment” in results presentation in this document. 
Risk communication (i.e. inform public-health decision making, support public 
confidence) is the dissemination of information about the chance or likelihood that 
an undesirable health event will occur as a result of immunization. The aim is to 
improve understanding of vaccine profile, as well as evidence-based decision making, 
at both collective and individual levels. It also includes research into optimizing 
risk communication and adjusting the communication message for different target 
audiences.
Appendix II:  
Definition of scientific areas of  
post-marketing vaccine safety monitoring
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Executive summary
Within the framework of the WHO project developing a global vaccine safety 
strategy (“Global Vaccine Safety Blueprint”) this study (Activity 1.2) investigated how 
international vaccine safety activities (IVSA) in the area of post-licensure vaccine safety 
monitoring can best serve the needs of a global vaccine safety programme.
The SWOT analysis was enriched by complementary questions (SWOT+) highlighting 
the qualitative characteristics of IVSA. Fifteen activities (Table 1) met the inclusion 
criteria (section 3.1). A comprehensive SWOT for each of the areas of vaccine safety 
monitoring highlighted increasing international collaboration as a core strength, 
and introduction of new vaccines in LMIC as a major opportunity. Evidence for 
unsustainable funding schemes and the lack of political support to build capacity and 
promote international collaboration, as major weaknesses and threats, is also provided 
(Tables 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). 
Furthermore, current services provided by IVSA at the global level were analysed 
to highlight gaps and potential synergies, redundancies and possible distribution of 
responsibilities among IVSA. All areas of vaccine safety monitoring are addressed 
by one or more IVSA (Table 2). However, there is a need for a strong coordinating 
infrastructure. The current focus is mainly on concern detection and validation 
(Table 3, Figure 1). A global strategy for building and utilizing health-care databases, 
as well as a central infrastructure for coordination, federation of databases, and data 
management and analysis is needed, to account for the gaps in reliably testing hypotheses 
and communicating risk (section 4.4.1). In addition, an integrated strategy should be 
built and implemented for communication between agencies, countries and IVSA. 
In terms of shared goals, there is a high commitment to capacity building, innovation 
and development (Table 4, Figure 2). System evaluation is represented by only a few 
IVSA. The increased need for additional and trained staff in all areas highlights the 
need to establish and implement structured training and to sustain funding of IVSA. 
Limited resources highlight the need for the development and structured implementation 
of electronic tools, saving person time and thus improving current capacity needs specific 
to LMIC. 
To move global safety monitoring to today’s level of requirements, it is paramount 
to strengthen national-health systems to establish and maintain health-care databases 
and their secondary use for public health and research. International collaboration and 
strengthened global structures are essential to coordinate and support local vaccine 
safety activities. Current IVSA are in the position to provide the required services, 
pending sustainable funding and a global strategic plan guiding concerted action to 
achieve our common aims.
Enhanced Strength-Weakness-
Opportunity-Threat (SWOT+) 
Analysis Of International Vaccine 
Safety Activities (IVSA)
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1. Rationale
Vaccine safety activities are important in all settings regardless of the income status. 
Although governments in developed economies have largely accepted and funded 
activities, LMIC have, in most cases, to rely financially and technically on global 
initiatives to establish an activity. However, there is only limited understanding of the 
impact of IVSA on the needs of LMIC. There is potential for optimizing and guiding 
concerted international collaboration to achieve common aims. 
The development of a global blueprint for vaccine safety monitoring by the World Health 
Organisation, with funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, will permit 
harmonization of IVSA by describing strategic plans, budget and funding options, and 
governance principles of a globally integrated vaccine safety consortium. It is based on 
a structured analysis of vaccine safety monitoring infrastructure (Activities 1.1 to 1.7) 
with particular focus on LMIC, of which the current study is an integral part. 
2. Goals 
Within the framework of developing the blueprint, this study (Activity 1.2) aims to 
describe how established IVSA can best serve the needs of a global vaccine safety 
programme, and also to propose roles and responsibilities.
3. SWOT analysis design
A SWOT analysis is enriched by complementary questions (SWOT+) guiding 
harmonization and capacity building at the global level. For the purpose of this SWOT+, 
the following definitions of terms apply.
Activity is used synonymously for any project, initiative, commitment or •	
dedicated action in the field of post-marketing vaccine safety, with an international 
scope and a track record of at least one year, and visible outcomes. 
Strengths are defined as internal capabilities to reach a specific goal, e.g. •	
experienced staff, necessary infrastructure.
Weaknesses are defined as internal deficiencies to reach a specific goal, e.g. rigid •	
organizational structure, lack of trained staff.
Opportunities are defined as external factors that positively influence an activity •	
to reach a goal, e.g. political/ legal support.
Threats are defined as external factors negatively influencing an activity to reach •	
a goal, e.g. economic crises, adverse media attention. 
3.1 Selection of IVSA 
The Collaborative Group defined the requirements and characteristics of an IVSA 
during two retreats (9–11 February 2010, Geneva, and 6–8 July 2010, London). IVSA 
were characterized and defined by:
having international scope (i.e. involving more than one country); •	
a track record of activity for at least one year (i.e. implementation, not planning •	
phase);
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concerned with post-licensure vaccine safety monitoring;•	
advocating vaccine safety (i.e. recognizing the public-health benefit of vaccines •	
and contributing to the evaluation of their risk-benefit profile);
being recognized by the Brighton Collaboration as a resource of trusted •	
information and support (i.e. activities with a track record of high-quality 
scientific information);
being respected as a trusted consultant by regional, national and international •	
monitoring systems (i.e. activities with a track record of consultations deemed 
useful by the beneficiaries).
IVSA are identified based on Activity 1.1 of the Global Blueprint and selected by the 
Collaborative Group based on the predefined criteria outlined above.
4. Results
Fifteen IVSA met the inclusion criteria (Table 1). Several additional activities concerned 
with post-licensure vaccine safety monitoring were initially identified for evaluation, or 
proposed for inclusion via the stakeholder survey (Activity 1.1 of the Global Blueprint). 
However, they were either one-time projects or meetings, or not international in scope. 
From the IVSA included, we received completed questionnaires from all 15 participants 
(100% return rate).
Table 1: Fifteen activities were selected by the Collaborative Group  
during the London retreat 6–8 July 2010
Nr Activity Lead organization
1
WHO Programme for International Drug Monitoring – the Uppsala Monitoring Centre 
(UMC) WHO – UMC
2 Post-marketing surveillance network of recently prequalified vaccines (PMS Net) WHO
3 National regulatory authority assessment (NRA) WHO
4 Vaccine safety training programmes (VS training)
WHO – IVB, 
GACVS
5 Developing Countries’ Vaccines Regulators Network (DCVRN) WHO
6
Council for International Organization of Medical Science (CIOMS) and WHO working 
group on vaccine pharmacovigilance CIOMS – WHO
7
Case definitions, guidelines, protocols for standardized verification of adverse events 
(standards – BC) BC
8 Automatic case verification (ABC – BC) BC
9
Global vaccine safety data link (GVSD) – background rates for concern verification 
(BGR – BC) BC
10 Vaccine safety crisis management/rapid response team WHO – UMC
11 GVSD – hypothesis-testing studies BC
12 Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety concerns (GACVS) WHO
13 Building public confidence/rumour surveillance project LSHTM
14 Vaccine safety concern response and consultancy service CDC (USA)
15 International collaborative vaccine safety consortium (WHO/FDA) WHO – FDA
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4.1 Regions
Most IVSA support all WHO regions. The DCVRN is not active in the WHO European 
Region. Together with its partners, the BC has built methodological and technical 
infrastructure for international collaborative studies in Europe. While the CDC 
International Standards Organization (ISO) has provided international consultancy 
services for more than a decade to surveillance systems on all continents, the group is 
currently reforming and defining its new direction and scope.
4.2 Summarized services
In general, all areas of vaccine safety monitoring are addressed by one or more IVSA 
(Table 2). The approach by each activity taken to address the goals in the respective 
areas varies, and is analysed in more detail in the sections below. The key questions 
to be addressed are, uniqueness versus redundancy of activities performed by IVSA, 
as well as the degree to which IVSA addresses local needs.
Table 2: Summarized services (= actually being performed)
AREAS
Concern 
detection
Concern 
validation
Hypothesis 
testing
Risk 
communication
GO
AL
S
Providing and communicating 
evidence    
Innovation, development    
Capacity building    
System evaluation    
4.3 IVSA by area
IVSA provide services at the national level, towards specific goals, in the areas 
outlined in Table 3. There is an uneven distribution of IVSA across the different 
areas. Representation is decreasing, from concern detection, to concern validation, 
to hypothesis testing, to risk communication. This is not only true for the areas, but also 
for the goals within the areas; decreasing from providing evidence, to innovation and 
development, to capacity building and system evaluation. Overall, risk communication 
appears to be the area least represented (Figure 1).
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Table 3: Services provided in the different areas by activity;  
(E = providing and communicating evidence; ID = innovation, development;  
CB = capacity building; EV = system evaluation)
Concern 
detection
Concern 
validation
Hypothesis 
testing
Risk 
communication
E ID CB EV E ID CB EV E ID CB EV E ID CB EV
1  UMC – WHO
2  PMS Net – WHO
3  NRA – WHO
4  VS training – WHO
5  DCVRN – WHO
6  CIOMS – WHO
7  Case definitions & guidelines – BC
8  ABC – BC
9  BGR – BC
10  VS crisis management – WHO
11  Hypothesis-testing – BC
12  GACVS – WHO
13  Public confidence – LSHTM
14  VS response – CDC
15
International VS consortium –  
FDA/WHO
 Number 4 7 9 7 5 7 9 3 3 6 7 3 6 2 4 0
 % of IVSA 27 47 60 47 33 47 60 20 20 40 47 20 40 13 27 0
 % of all services 5 9 11 9 6 9 11 4 4 7 9 4 7 2 5 0
 TOTAL % 33 29 23 15
Figure 1 highlights the findings shown in Table 3 by visualizing the pattern of distribution 
of IVSA in the various areas and goals. This figure allows rapid assessment of the current 
situation, and facilitates evaluation of the impact of a global vaccine safety programme. 
It can guide strategic planning by identifying areas of over and under representation. 
For example, the decreasing representation of detection>validation>testing> 
communication can be easily appreciated from this graph. Figure 1 further dissects 
areas of over and under representation by highlighting areas of potential overlap 
between IVSA when grouped by organization. Whether this represents duplication 
of organizational strategy, or the opportunity for synergistic interaction, is further 
elaborated in the sections below. For example, the involvement of WHO and the 
Brighton Collaboration in concern detection, validation and testing has different 
synergistic emphases. While WHO is focusing more on capacity building, the BC 
is focusing more on system evaluation as part of concern detection and innovation, 
and development as part of validation and hypothesis-testing. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of groups of IVSA  
(WHO, BC, others = LSHTM, USCDC) by areas and goals;  
(E = providing and communicating evidence, ID = innovation, development,  
CB = capacity building, EV = system evaluation)
BC %
E
ID
CB
EVE
E
ID
CB
EVE
ID
EV
CB
EV
CB
ID
Risk communication
Hypothesis testing
Concern detection
Concern validation
WHO %
Others %
50% 30%
4.4 IVSA by goals 
IVSA provide services at the national level towards specific areas in the following 
goals (Table 4). In general, there is a high commitment towards capacity building, 
and innovation and development. Systematic evaluation of hypothesis testing and 
risk-communication activities seem to be represented only by a few IVSA (Figure 2).
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Table 4: Services provided in the different goals by activity;  
(CD = concern detection, CV = concern validation,  
HY = hypothesis testing, RC = risk communication)
Providing and 
communicating 
evidence
Innovation, 
development
Capacity 
building
System 
evaluation
CD CV HY RC CD CV HY RC CD CV HY RC CD CV HY RC
1  UMC – WHO
2  PMS Net – WHO
3  NRA – WHO
4  VS training – WHO
5  DCVRN – WHO
6  CIOMS – WHO
7  Case definitions & guidelines – BC
8  ABC – BC
9  BGR – BC
10  VS crisis management – WHO
11  Hypothesis testing – BC
12  GACVS – WHO
13  Public confidence – LSHTM
14  VS response – CDC
15
International VS consortium –  
FDA/WHO
 Number 4 5 3 6 7 7 6 2 9 9 7 4 7 3 3 0
 % of IVSA 27 33 20 40 47 47 40 13 60 60 47 27 47 20 20 0
 % of all services 5 6 4 7 9 9 7 2 11 11 9 5 9 4 4 0
 TOTAL % 18 22 29 13
Figure 2 highlights the findings shown in Table 4 by visualizing the pattern of IVSA 
involvement in the various areas and goals. This figure allows rapid assessment of 
the current situation, and also the evaluation of the impact of a global vaccine safety 
programme. It will guide strategic planning by identification of areas of over and 
under representation. Figure 2 further dissects areas of over and under representation 
by highlighting potential overlap. Whether this represents duplication of work 
or the opportunity for synergistic interaction is further elaborated in the sections 
below. For example, WHO is by far the strongest capacity builder and is developing 
spontaneous reporting systems through several IVSA. The BC is strong in innovation 
and development for hypothesis testing studies and case verification, as well as system 
evaluation for concern detection and hypothesis testing. Only a few IVSA provide 
and communicate evidence. This probably reflects that data are primarily generated 
at national level and by specific research groups, and indicates an opportunity for 
internationally coordinated efforts in this area.
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Figure 2: Distribution of groups of IVSA  
(WHO, BC, others = LSHTM, USCDC) by areas and goals;  
(CD = concern detection, CV = concern validation,  
HY = hypothesis testing, RC = risk communication) 
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The sections below further crystallize how capacity is built and what exactly each IVSA 
has innovated and developed. The goals of providing and communicating evidence, 
as well as system evaluation, are not specified, as instructive details of how the respective 
goal is achieved were not solicited.
Training and consultancy are dominant, and equally represented in capacity building. 
Providing funding, infrastructure and educational material are comparatively 
underrepresented. In addition, international consensus is needed on the delineation of 
consultancy services and training. 
There is an almost equal distribution between tools, standards and policies in innovation 
and development. While this distribution appears reasonable, it might be argued that 
policy and recommendations are functionally closer to consultancies as part of capacity 
building, rather than actual innovations. 
4.4.1 Linkage of health-care databases
Several IVSA are dedicated to promoting the availability and use of health-care databases 
for vaccine safety monitoring. There are three main elements: (1) outcome databases 
(OD), including disease/death databases and hospital records; (2) exposure databases 
(ED), including immunization databases; (3) national unique patient identifiers (UI). 
Figure 3 shows the respective involvement of IVSA in providing and communicating 
evidence (e.g. data generation), innovation and development (e.g. electronic tools), 
capacity building (e.g. infrastructure for international data sharing) and system 
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evaluation (e.g. quality assurance) of these main elements. Seven out of 15 IVSA indicated 
providing provision for health-care database services. Overall, IVSA are most active 
in the area of capacity building (32%), followed by providing and communicating 
evidence about baseline data (27%), innovating and developing methods and tools 
for the generation and management of vaccine safety data from health-care databases 
(23%), and the evaluation of health-care databases (18%) (Figure 3). Thirty per cent of 
IVSA services focus on exposure databases and 70% on outcome databases. No activity 
explicitly targets the establishment of national unique patient identifier systems.
Figure 3: Distribution of linkage of health-care database services  
(i.e. OD, ED, UI) by goals; (E = providing and communicating evidence,  
ID = innovation, development, CB = capacity building, EV = system evaluation) 
E
18%
ID
23%
CB
32%
EV
27%
4.4.2 Enabling services
Regional sharing of data and other information, political recognition, legal frameworks 
and public perception, and beliefs in vaccine safety are the key elements of enabling 
services. Eleven out of 15 IVSA are active in enabling services. Overall, IVSA focus 
on the areas of capacity building (CB) for enabling services (28%), followed by the 
evaluation of data-sharing systems, political recognition, the legal framework or public 
perception (26%) and providing and communicating evidence (E) (23%), and innovating 
and developing methods and tools (ID) (23%) (Figure 4). IVSA provide 40% of services 
enabling regional data sharing, 30% targeting public perception, 26% eliciting political 
recognition and 4% providing a legal framework. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of enabling services by goals; providing and 
communicating evidence (E), innovation, development (ID), capacity building 
(CB), system evaluation (EV)
E
23%
ID
23%CB
28%
EV
26%
4.5 Staff in IVSA
Table 5 gives an overview of the current situation and 5-year development plan of 
teams by IVSA (0.9 = 90%, 1 = 100% time job). The overall distribution of scientific, 
coordinative and administrative full time equivalents (FTEs) is 61%, 27% and 12%, 
respectively. The number of staff engaged in WHO NRA assessment (16) is an outlier 
and refers to regional office staff. Other activities are more centrally organized and 
engage only a fraction of staff, with 1–2 FTE. On an organizational level, most FTE 
are located at WHO (n=28) — even after possible modification of the staff assigned 
to NRA assessment (n=13). Currently, CDC has no personnel assigned to IVSA, due 
to current internal reorganization. Apparently, 10 FTE are planned at CDC. The total 
planned FTE foresees an increase of about 80% (21 FTE) within the next five years. 
The overall distribution of scientific, coordinative, and administrative FTEs is 56%, 
26% and 18%, respectively. Thus, a disproportional increase of administrative FTEs is 
planned. Of the 21 planned FTE, 10 are envisioned by, and at, CDC, five by BC, four 
by WHO and two by others.
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Table 5: Distribution of staff engaged in IVSA;  
(SMC = scientific, medical or communication, C = coordination,  
A = administrative, * = TBD, ** = NA, v = volunteers)
 ID  Name
Actual FTE Planned FTE
SMC C A Total SMC C A Total
1 UMC – WHO 0.9 0.1 0 1 1.2 0.1 0 1.3
2 PMS Net – WHO 1.6 0.2 0.1 1.9 * * * 0
3 NRA – WHO 3 0.75 0.6 4.3 3 0.75 0.6 4.3
4 VS training – WHO ** ** ** 0 2 0.5 1.5 4
5 DCVRN – WHO 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
6 CIOMS – WHO 1.25 0.1 0.1 1.4 * * * 0
7 Case definitions & guidelines – BC 0.5 0.5 0.2 1.2 2 1 0.2 3.2
8 ABC – BC 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.2 1.2
9 BGR – BC 0.5 0.5 0.2 1.2 1 0.5 0.4 1.9
10 VS crisis management – WHO 2.75 0.1 0.4 3.25 4.5 0.2 0.8 5.5
11 Hypothesis testing – BC 0.5 0.5 0.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1 4
12 GACVS – WHO 0.7 0.5 0.5 1.7 0.7 0.5 1 2.2
13 Public confidence – LSHTM 4.6 2 0.5 7.1 5.6 2.5 1.5 9.6
14 VS response – CDC 0.05 0.1 – 0.2 5.6 2.5 1.5 9.6
15 International VS consortium – FDA/ WHO v 1 0.2 1.2 v 1.1 0.2 1.25
Total WHO 10.2 3.7 1.9 15.8 11.4 4.1 4.1 19.6
Total BC 2.0 1.7 0.8 4.5 5.0 3.5 1.8 10.3
Total others 4.7 2.1 0.5 7.2 11.2 5.0 3.0 19.2
Total per type of staff 16.9 7.5 3.2 27.5 27.6 12.6 8.9 49.1
4.6 Analysis of weaknesses and threats
Table 6 shows the results of the analysis of weaknesses and threats mentioned by the 
IVSA. Thirteen out of 15 IVSA mentioned that the soft and unsustainable funding bases 
of their activities were the biggest threat. The lack of funds and the reliability on soft 
money is directly influencing manpower and expertise (11 out of 15 IVSA).
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Table 6: Analysis of weaknesses and threats mentioned by the IVSA
No of 
IVSA
1. Soft, unsustainable funding 13
2. Expertise and manpower 11
3. Methods, data, timeliness CD, CV, HY, RC 5
4. Advocacy, willingness, commitment 4
5. Global shared strategic plan, SOPs 3
6. Lack of national immunization programme involvement in PMS 1
7. Lack of collaboration between NRA and MOH (NIP)
8. Collaboration with other organizations 1
9. Certification and monitoring system (evaluation systems) 1
10. Geographical distribution 1
4.6.1 Concern detection
Table 7: SWOT analysis for the area concern detection
Strengths Weaknesses
Globally centralized reporting system with standard  •
report form 
Global database of spontaneous AEFI reports  •
Interactive network established  •
WHO is highly trusted coordination and evaluation  •
hub 
Influencing local decision making •
Strong international technical expertise •
Established training programmes •
System or signal evaluation in place •
Soft, unsustainable funding at the international level  •
Lack of human resources  •
Slow implementation of funds  •
Lack of national immunization programme  •
involvement in PMS
Lack of collaboration between NRA and MOH (NIP) •
Lack of training and advocacy •
Training demand exceeds WHO capacity •
Limited collaboration with organisations that have  •
training capacity
Lack of international data-exchange agreements •
Opportunities Threats
Increasing electronic infrastructure in LMIC  •
Increasing recognition of importance in LMIC •
Increasing general investment in LMIC health  •
systems
Network expansion •
Recognized need for training •
Consequences of soft, unsustainable funding •
Loss of centralized coordination  •
Lack of institutional development process for post- •
marketing surveillance
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4.6.2 Concern validation
Table 8: SWOT analysis for the area concern validation
Strengths Weaknesses
Broad stakeholder representation •
Strong methodological expertise •
Dedicated and large global network of experts •
Highly cost effective •
Automated validation tools  •
Rapid-response teams for concern validation can  •
be built
Expert committee evaluating concerns •
Lack of funds  •
Lack of central coordinating staff  •
Low LMIC representation  •
Delayed dissemination and implementation •
Limited availability and timely deployment of rapid- •
response teams for concern validation 
Lack of standard operating procedures for concern  •
validation by rapid-response teams
Opportunities Threats
Increasing recognition of the need in LMIC •
Increasing numbers of vaccine safety crises •
Increasing investment in safety surveillance  •
infrastructure
Increasing need for global collaboration •
Consequences of soft, unsustainable funding  •
The lack of willingness to update current systems to  •
reflect shared standards 
Lack of collaboration between NRA and MOH  •
Lack of international data-exchange agreements •
4.6.3 Hypothesis testing
Table 9: SWOT analysis for the area hypothesis testing
Strengths Weaknesses
Dedicated and large network  •
Simple, flexible and elegant infrastructure for data  •
management, transfer and analysis
Active knowledge transfer to LMIC •
Internationally shared protocols for various study  •
designs available 
Liaisons with local researchers, institutions and  •
hospitals
Flexible participation requirement depending on  •
national resources
Expert committee reviewing hypothesis testing  •
results 
Lack of funds for study coordination and conduct  •
Lack of electronic health records and immunization  •
registries in LMIC
Lack of international data-exchange agreements  •
Opportunities Threats
Increasing availability of electronic health records  •
and immunization registries in LMIC 
Lack of political willingness and public-health priority  •
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4.6.4 Risk communication
Table 10: SWOT analysis for the area risk communication
Strengths Weaknesses
Global advisory committee in place (GACVS) •
International advisory group, focus on LMIC  •
Tools in development •
Soft, unsustainable funding at the international level •
Lack of international data-exchange agreements •
Lack of staff and widely shared expertise •
Opportunities Threats
Most underdeveloped area •
Increasing recognition of importance •
Consequences of soft, unsustainable funding  •
5. Discussion
In the framework of the WHO project developing a global vaccine safety strategy, 
this study (Activity 1.2) describes how established IVSA can best serve the needs 
of a GLOBAL VACCINE SAFETY PROGRAMME and proposes roles and 
responsibilities. 
We believe that this is the first SWOT analysis of IVSA. The SWOT analysis was 
enriched by complementary questions (SWOT+) guiding harmonization and capacity 
building at the global level. The SWOT analysis highlights the qualitative characteristics 
of the individual IVSA. These characteristics are unique to each IVSA and cannot 
usefully be compared analytically. However, to guide the development of the global 
vaccine safety strategy, we have standardized the individual services and summarized 
the collective strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats by area of vaccine 
safety monitoring (Tables 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). The SWOT has provided individual IVSA 
profiles (available in the full report) which may be utilized for identification of potential 
redundancies, synergies and distribution of responsibilities among IVSA. The SWOT 
analysis has highlighted that increasing international collaboration and networking are 
perceived as strengths in all areas. The increasing introduction of new vaccines in LMIC 
is seen as a major opportunity to foster international collaboration among most of the 
IVSA in all areas. Unsustainable funding schemes and the lack of political willingness 
to build capacity and promote international collaboration are perceived as the major 
threats to addressing apparent needs. The lack of trained staff in all areas, not only 
at the national but also at the international level, highlights the need to establish and 
implement structured training. 
To illustrate the number and relative distribution of IVSA across the different areas 
and goals of vaccine safety monitoring, we have employed spider-web graphs. 
They neither inform about the quality of the work performed, nor do they highlight an 
implied need by the area not covered, but show the pattern of distribution visualizing the 
numbers of IVSA addressing the various areas and goals of vaccine safety monitoring. 
This can be used as a tool to inform strategic planning, by streamlining and prioritizing 
current activities as well as identifying potential gaps. 
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In general, all areas of vaccine safety monitoring, including concern detection, validation, 
hypothesis testing and risk communication, as well as enabling services, are addressed 
by one or more IVSA. Thus, at the international level, there is awareness of all areas of 
vaccine safety monitoring relevant to LMIC, and the basic resources to provide some 
of the services required (Table 2). However, there is a need for streamlining the current 
activities, fostering expansion, in the light of increasing demand from LMIC, and also 
well concerted global collaboration. Therefore, a strong coordinating infrastructure is 
needed at the global level.
The different areas of vaccine safety monitoring are not equally addressed by the 
IVSA. The current focus is mainly on concern detection and validation (Figure 1). 
Most IVSA have highlighted the increased need for a robust vaccine safety monitoring 
infrastructure due to increased development and marketing of vaccines in LMIC. 
This involves reliable hypothesis testing and risk- communication capacity. There are 
currently two IVSA actively addressing this need; The International Collaborative 
Vaccine Safety Consortium and the Brighton Collaboration Global Vaccine Safety 
Datalink. A global strategy for building and utilizing health-care databases, as well as 
a central infrastructure for coordination, federation of databases, and data management 
and analysis, is needed. Only one IVSA is exclusively dedicated to risk communication; 
building public confidence – rumour surveillance project. In concert with other IVSA 
significantly involved in risk communication, an integrated strategy for communication 
between agencies, countries and IVSA should be built and implemented. 
In terms of goals, there is a high commitment to capacity building, and innovation and 
development (Table 4). System evaluation seems to be represented only by few IVSA 
(Figure 2). This appears to be a reasonable distribution, given that capacity building and 
innovation in the various areas requires highly specialized expertise and benefits from 
well-coordinated interaction of multiple partners. On the other hand, system evaluation 
may benefit more from a highly centralized and conceptualized approach. As the global 
umbrella of public-health organizations involved in vaccine safety, as well as national 
immunization programmes, the WHO appears to be most suited to oversee system 
evaluation and quality control. WHO NRA assessments have extensive and unique 
experience in evaluating spontaneous reporting systems. Subject-matter expertise on 
other vaccine safety areas should be provided to WHO by the respective IVSA. 
For capacity building, training and consultancies are the focus of current activities. 
Whether consultancies are considered as capacity building or as an integral part of 
providing any service, is a matter of consensus on classification. For future use of our 
proposed SWOT+ approach to monitor and evaluate vaccine safety services available and 
capacity at the international level, we propose to build consensus on a shared glossary 
of terms utilized and understood by all stakeholders in the field. Such a glossary would 
comprise, for future reference, a comprehensive set of technical terms related to post-
marketing vaccine safety monitoring. 
Similarly, the need for educational materials and structured training overwhelms 
current capacity. Therefore, modules and a content syllabus for comprehensive vaccine 
safety training delivered by the various IVSA in their respective areas of expertise, 
as well as by public health, academic, and private market training institutions, should be 
developed and implemented. We consider consultancies to rarely represent structured 
training. Thus, we would recommend classifying consultancies as being directly linked 
to providing and communicating evidence. 
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Providing funding and building infrastructure are the most obvious services to directly 
build capacity. Both are comparatively underrepresented. Given the increasing impact 
of safety concerns on global health, the fact that most work is based on time restricted 
“soft money” we believe to be irresponsible. 
Apart from training of current staff at the international level, there is an increased 
need for additional staff, given the increasing need for globally concerted action. 
An increase of about 80% (21 FTE) is anticipated in the next five years, and will involve 
scientific, coordinating and administrative personnel (Table 5). Given the public-health 
importance of vaccine safety and the extensive work done on an international level, 
the number of staff involved is marginal. The most cost effective and flexible engagement 
of this additional workforce should be considered. This will require significant direct 
and sustainable funding. 
In terms of infrastructure, the limited resources highlight the need for the development 
and structured implementation of electronic tools saving person time and addressing 
current shortcomings and issues specific to LMIC, while improving timely availability 
of high quality and comparable vaccine safety information. To move global safety 
monitoring to today’s requirement levels, serious investment is paramount in 
strengthening national health systems, to establish and maintain health databases and 
their secondary use for public health and research. The availability of international 
infrastructures and simple electronic tools, plus established methodologies and 
successful proof of principle studies should meet the current efforts in LMIC building 
electronic health databases. 
6. Conclusions
Never before has there been a better opportunity to utilize national and 
international strengths to meet the increasing need of robust vaccine safety monitoring 
and research in LMIC. There is international awareness of this need. The components 
necessary to build sustainable vaccine safety monitoring in LMIC are known. 
Highly-specified vaccine safety expertise, and vast experience, is available at a global 
level. Health-care capacity is being built in LMIC. The time is right to leverage 
international expertise and promote international collaboration to strengthen national 
vaccine safety monitoring and international sharing of vaccine safety data. The currently 
available IVSA are in the position to provide the required services, pending a sustainable 
funding base and a global strategic plan. 
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Concern detection (i.e. signal detection, signal generation) is defined as any genuine 
or alleged professional or public questioning related to the safety of a given vaccine or 
its associated programme. Passive surveillance is the collection of spontaneous AEFI 
reports on a case-by-case basis by medical care providers or laboratories to the local 
or national health agency. Active surveillance is the regular or proactive solicitation of 
adverse event reports on a case-by-case basis from health-care providers or facilities, 
for example, by regular distribution of reporting cards and the active follow-up by a 
dedicated investigator.
Concern validation (i.e. signal strengthening) is the process to verify and strengthen a 
detected vaccine safety concern. It includes the act of verifying the relevant exposures 
and the outcome(s), as well as their known interactions.
Hypothesis testing (i.e. association studies, signal verification) is done by controlled 
epidemiologic studies to accept or reject a given null hypothesis. Hypothesis testing 
is different from causality assessment which describes the process of determining 
etiologic and pathophysiologic evidence for an event to be caused by immunization. 
This may be done on a case-by-case basis to make immediate decisions concerning 
the medical management. However, to generalize a causal relationship between 
immunization and a given health event, carefully designed epidemiological or laboratory 
experimental studies are required elucidating the aetiology and pathophysiologic 
mechanisms. 
Risk communication (i.e. inform public-health decision making, support public 
confidence) is the dissemination of information about the chance or likelihood that 
an undesirable health event will occur as a result of immunization. The aim is to 
improve understanding of vaccine profile, as well as evidence-based decision making, 
at both collective and individual levels. It also includes research into optimizing 
risk communication and adjusting the communication message for different target 
audiences.
Providing and communicating evidence is the goal of IVSA situated at the frontline 
of vaccine safety monitoring, by actively detecting concerns (e.g. signal detection, 
signal generation), actively validating concerns, actively testing safety hypothesis, 
or communicating risks. It is also the goal of IVSA responding with scientific rigour 
to vaccine safety issues of potential global importance. 
Innovating or developing standards, methods or tools is the goal of IVSA supporting 
monitoring, research or communication systems to improve concern detection, 
concern validation, hypothesis testing, or risk communication.
Appendix: Glossary
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Capacity building is the goal of IVSA supporting monitoring, research or 
communication systems to better detect concerns, validate concerns, test hypotheses, 
or communicate risks.
System evaluation is the goal of IVSA supporting concern detection, concern validation, 
hypothesis testing, or risk communication systems, by evaluating and consulting for 
improvement.
31WHO/IVB/12.04
1. Introduction
The perspectives of regulatory licensing authorities were assessed in countries that 
produce, procure, and both produce and procure vaccines. A web-based survey was 
developed to explore regulators’ knowledge, attitudes and practices concerning their 
national vaccine safety system. Additionally, their opinions about what would be 
needed to ensure future capacity and capabilities for a global vaccine safety system were 
probed, along with models of collaboration for regulatory authorities and the private 
sector that address public safety issues. 
This survey addressed four key objectives.
•	 To	 assess	 knowledge,	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 of	 low-	 and	middle-income	 
country vaccine safety systems from the perspective of licensing authorities in 
(a) producing, and (b) procuring countries.
•	 To	assess	expectations	of	(a)	producing,	and	(b)	procuring	countries,	regarding	a	
global vaccine safety system, in order to provide information essential to formulate 
the blueprint.
•	 To	 assess	 the	 understanding	 of	minimal	 capacity	 (from	high-	middle-	 and	 
low-income country regulators) for ensuring vaccine safety in their countries.
•	 To	assess	existing	models	of	collaboration	between	regulatory	authorities	with	
industry (in high- middle- and low-income countries). 
2. Description of methods
A sample frame of low- middle- and high-income countries with a range of population 
sizes, across WHO regions, was developed to meet the following inclusion criteria: 
•	 countries	that	produce,	procure,	and	both	produce	and	procure	vaccines;
•	 representation	of	all	WHO	regions	(AFR,	AMR,	SEAR,	EUR,	EMR,	WPR);
•	 representation	of	World	Bank	 categories	 for	high-	middle-	 and	 low-income	
countries;
•	 representation	of	countries	from	three	population	size	categories:	<	40	million,	
40–80 million, > 80 million.
The survey was sent to regulators in 32 countries and made available in English, 
French, Spanish and Russian versions. Responses were received from 19 countries and, 
additionally, a survey was completed by the European Medicines Agency (Table 1). 
Survey of regulators
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There was intentional overrepresentation of low- and middle-income countries in 
the sample frame, in order to capture data most relevant to the goals of the blueprint 
project. The WHO Region of the Americas was overrepresented to accommodate 
existing surveillance initiatives. Representation across all categories except one 
(we were unable to recruit a middle sized low-income country) was attained. 
We augmented our study findings by asking the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
to complete the survey. The EMA takes into consideration issues representative of 
27 Member countries of varying size and income, including the three European Region 
countries who independently responded to our survey. In all, data from three African 
Region, six Region of the Americas, three South-East Asia Region, three European 
Region, two Eastern Mediterranean Region and two Western Pacific Region countries 
were included in the survey. There was a final response rate of 59.4% (19 responding 
countries of 32 contacted). In total, data from 20 surveys (19 plus the EMA) were 
included in the analysis of this report. Overall, the actual survey sample provides good 
country representativeness.
Table 1: Survey sample frame
Population < 40m Population 40–80m Population > 80m
Hi
gh
4 of 5 (1 procuring, 1 producing 
and 2 producing and procuring 
countries)
1 of 1 (producing country) 1 of 1 (producing country)
Mi
dd
le 4 of 10 (3 procuring and  1 producing and procuring 
countries)
2 of 2 (both producing and 
procuring countries)
4 of 8 (1 procuring and  
3 producing and procuring 
countries)
Lo
w
2 of 3 (2 procuring countries) 0 of 1 1 of 1 (procuring country)
3. Main Findings
The responses of licensing authorities are organized into five sections. 
Section 1 AEFI reporting and post-market surveillance
Section 2  Expert advice
Section 3  Human resources and infrastructural capacity
Section 4  Regulatory-industry relationships
Section 5  Expectations among regulators of a Global Vaccine Safety Blueprint
3.1 Section 1: AEFI reporting and post-market surveillance
a) Low-income countries rely primarily on passive surveillance of adverse events 
following immunization; they acknowledge the need for active detection. 
Low-income countries expect that producing and procuring countries have high 
quality safety detection systems in place in order to produce and disseminate 
safety data to procuring countries. This may not be the case; in fact, it appears 
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that high-income countries do not have a direct role in receiving AEFI reports 
from procuring countries, seeing this instead as the manufacturer’s responsibility. 
The Brighton Collaboration standard case definitions still remain underused, 
and countries acknowledge improper knowledge of case definition and causality 
assessment of AEFI. Fear of accusation, underreporting and lack of knowledge 
are barriers to reporting in low-income countries.
b) Middle income countries. CIOMS reporting forms, as well as Expanded 
Programme on Immunization (EPI), are used in these countries. Regulators state 
that the general public can report AEFI in many of these countries. Several issues 
detract from vaccine safety reporting, including fear by vaccinators and officials 
concerning the consequences of reporting AEFI. There was wide recognition of 
the need for improved surveillance mechanisms in these countries.
c) The lack of high-income country surveillance for serious AEFI of vaccines 
exported into low- and middle-income countries represents a major gap in vaccine 
safety, especially where the major use of these vaccines does not occur in the 
exporting countries. Regulators report an over-reliance on companies reporting 
AEFI that needs to be addressed. 
3.2 Section 2: Expert advice 
a) All low-income countries that responded have a national adverse event review 
committee. Our data show that these countries have concerns with confidentiality 
and the proprietary nature of information between the expert body that advises the 
NRA and the national adverse events review committee. Most of these countries 
appear to be aware of the training and professional background needed to run 
an effective national adverse event review committee. All countries say they 
have access to experts, both nationally and internationally. National committee 
members are based in clinical practice. External experts are called when new 
vaccines are registered and when national experts are unable to identify or analyse 
AEFI. 
b) With the exception of Belize and South Africa, the middle-income countries 
surveyed all have a national adverse event review committee. National experts 
are based at universities and in clinical practice. One country indicated having 
problems with confidentiality between experts. These countries are aware and 
have good understanding of the professional background, training and expertise 
required to run an adverse event review committee. International experts are 
accessible through the Ibero-American Pharmacovigilance Network and WHO. 
Our data indicate that expert advice is difficult to implement, however, due to 
infrastructural and institutional factors. External experts are contacted when new 
vaccines are registered and when deaths occur. 
c) High-income countries reported having problems with confidentiality between 
experts. Belgium appears to be the only country that asks its experts to declare 
their conflict of interest on an annual basis. These countries are aware, and 
have good understanding of, the type of professional background, training and 
expertise required to run a national adverse event review committee. Experts are 
available nationally and internationally, with experts based at universities and in 
clinical practice. Expert advice is reported to be difficult to implement due to 
resource limitations. External experts are used on rare occasions and, in some 
cases, they are called on a case-by-case basis. These countries tend to consult with 
EMA, FDA, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and 
WHO. 
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3.3 Section 3: Human resources and infrastructural capacity
a) Low-income countries did not express a consistent view as to what would 
constitute minimal staff requirements (e.g. personnel) for a national vaccine safety 
system. In terms of infrastructure, these countries state a need for buildings, land, 
computer equipment and control laboratories. The regulators suggest that the 
central role of a NRA should involve AEFI surveillance, ensure registration and 
licensing of vaccines, capture/file AEFI data, and training of personnel. 
b) A few middle-income countries provided information on what constitutes 
minimal capacity in terms of staff requirements. In terms of infrastructure, 
these countries need information and communication technology, and offices 
and vaccine storage sites. They stressed the central role of communication with 
manufacturers for NRAs, along with the importance of updating information 
on safety issues, periodic regulatory inspections and design laws, and policies 
and protocols to govern immunization.
c) Not all high-income countries provided information on what constitutes 
minimal capacity in terms of staff requirements. Australia explicitly identified a 
number count (thirteen) for experts needed. Overall, it was stated that the central 
roles of a NRA involve collecting, monitoring and assessing all safety-related 
information submitted by the manufacturers, and providing expert advice on 
weight of evidence of signals detected through the monitoring system. 
3.4 Section 4: Regulatory-industry relationships 
a) In low-income countries, vaccine manufacturers provide information 
that includes clinical trials data, periodic safety update reports (PSURs), 
summary of product characteristics and company core data information. 
The regulators would like additional information, such as AEFI reported in 
other countries. Meetings with manufacturers are triggered by faulty products, 
low quality and toxicity issues. Vaccine manufacturers were seen as providing 
very limited support to low-income countries. These countries often collaborate 
with manufacturers when the national testing laboratories are unable to conduct 
special tests. Meetings with manufacturers are requested by the Ministry of Health 
or the Director General of Health Services. 
b) In middle-income countries, vaccine manufacturers meet with the NRAs 
before the submission of intent to file a new vaccine. Cuba is the only country 
that holds public audiences with manufacturers. Vaccine manufacturers provide 
safety information to NRAs, which includes clinical trials data, PSURs, 
risk-management plans for new vaccines and AEFI data reported from other 
countries. Middle-income country regulators would like additional information 
that would include, for example, non-clinical studies, quality-attributable 
aspects and two years of field-safety data (from developing countries) before 
the product is introduced in the country. Few countries receive support from 
manufacturers. When support is provided, it assumes the form of training courses. 
NRAs contact vaccine manufacturers when there is a serious AEFI cluster and repetitive 
cold-chain complaints. Meetings with the manufacturers are requested by NRAs. 
These countries indicated that an ideal system to deal with AEFI should be one that 
is electronic and fast, and that facilitates close cooperation among stakeholders. 
All middle-income country respondents reported that all manufacturers were 
willing to work with them.
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c) With the exception of France, no high-income country surveyed, 
explicitly requires vaccine manufacturers to meet the regulator before 
submission of intent to file a new vaccine application. Rather, manufacturers 
are “encouraged” to meet regulators prior to filing a new vaccine submission. 
The safety information provided in meetings with vaccine manufacturers includes 
AEFI data reported from other countries, clinical trials data, PSURs, summary of 
product characteristics and toxicology data. Circumstances that prompt meetings 
with manufacturers include important safety signals, issues in quality control, 
clinical study plan and new indications. Countries have systems in place 
for providing and receiving feedback on safety information. Collaborations 
between regulators and manufacturers assume the form of meetings, roundtables 
and workshops. Our respondents asserted that, despite some challenges 
(e.g. unclear AEFI reports), most manufacturers are willing to work and 
collaborate with them. 
3.5 Section 5: Expectations among regulators of a Global Vaccine Safety 
Blueprint
a) Low-income countries expect financial support for the establishment of a national 
centre for AEFI monitoring, support in transmitting and sharing information 
on AEFI, reinforcing efforts to control counterfeit vaccines, and short-term 
consultancy services. These regulators saw the lack of financial resources as a 
major problem in the creation of a global vaccine safety system. Low-income 
country regulators asserted that their own national vaccine safety systems could 
be improved by establishing functional NRAs and national control laboratory 
(NCL) systems, and training dedicated human resources assigned to deal with 
AEFI. They considered the key challenges in making these improvements to be 
political will (commitment) and the lack of clear guidelines (policies).
b) Middle-income countries expect rapid exchange of vaccine safety information 
across countries, assurance that all vaccines are prequalified before licensing for 
public use, new AEFI guidelines, and technical assistance and capacity building. 
They saw the main challenges to creating a global vaccine safety system to be in 
establishing a standardized communication network among countries, political 
will among governments, and getting stakeholders to be fully involved with the 
system. 
 Regulators of middle-income countries stressed that their own national vaccine 
safety systems could be improved by having full-time personnel working on 
AEFI at regional levels, through a global harmonization of an AEFI system and 
also through stronger commitment from government and the private sector. 
The challenges in making these improvements are funding, political will, high 
turnover of personnel, a shortage of qualified professionals and conflicts of 
interest. 
c) High-income countries expect transparency in the sharing of vaccine safety 
information, an early alert system with timely information on safety issues 
identified within other jurisdictions, and harmonization. Regulators saw 
the main challenges for the creation of a global vaccine safety system to be 
gaining agreement on the standards to be applied and funding availability, 
capacity building in developing countries, compatible reporting systems 
for database entry, partnerships across public and private organizations, 
and confidentiality agreements. 
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 High-income country regulators asserted that their own national vaccine safety 
systems could be improved by moving towards more real-time analysis, use of 
electronic administrative health data, international collaborations, agreement 
on a consistent reporting form, and better definition of the communications 
process. The challenges in making these improvements included resistance to 
change, and lack of access to administrative electronic data, resources and external 
communications. 
Appendix 1 presents a comparative summary of the knowledge, attitudes, 
practices and expectations regarding global vaccine safety by regulators from 
low- middle- and high-income countries. 
4. Discussion and conclusions
We identified four main findings from this survey.
4.1 Fear of reporting is an obstacle to AEFI reporting in low- and middle-
income countries
In terms of consistent training and education of qualified public-health personnel in 
low- and middle-income countries, our survey found that there are many challenges to 
reporting AEFI that relate to fear of accusation, underreporting and lack of knowledge. 
This was a significant finding of the study that needs special attention. Our respondents 
stated that political will, as well as resources that target more effective training of 
public-health officials and vaccinators, could address these issues. These factors have 
a great impact on both the real and perceived confidence in any vaccine safety system. 
The lack of understanding surrounding the role of AEFI investigation, notification 
and communication, as a way to dismiss false information and to increase confidence 
in vaccinations, is a critical issue. Increased support, including education, training and 
provision of sufficient infrastructure for local health-care workers, would contribute 
to alleviating the “fears” (structural misunderstandings about the purpose of reporting) 
that are reported here. This, however, can only be successful if there is the political 
will to ensure the expertise, protection and authority of those who report AEFI 
(i.e. human resources). This issue remains a global challenge. 
4.2 Vaccine-exporting countries neither track nor collect AEFI data from 
low income and procuring countries 
The fact that high income, vaccine-exporting countries neither track nor collect AEFI 
data from low- and middle-income procuring countries might be considered a social 
justice issue. Furthermore, placing the responsibility for this tracking on the shoulders 
of the Marketing Authorization Holder might be viewed as a dangerous conflict of 
interest in regulatory governance. Several countries acknowledged concerns about 
conflict of interest among their expert advisors. There were some notable differences 
between high income, and low- and middle-income countries with regard to regulatory 
acceptance of support from vaccine manufacturers. While high-income countries stated 
that they received no support from manufacturers, several low- and middle-income 
countries acknowledged marginal support from vaccine manufacturers, mainly relating 
to training. Certainly low-income countries recognized a paucity of qualified personnel 
that affects their capabilities, although even high-income countries expressed a need for 
more staff, especially as they attempt to move towards more active surveillance.
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4.3 Almost all countries indicate that AEFI forms need to be standardized 
and internationally harmonized 
Universally, regulators of countries surveyed wanted to see more fully integrated 
(harmonized) public-health systems that would also be greatly assisted by the necessary 
transition from passive to active surveillance of AEFI. Active surveillance remains a 
critical challenge, even for many high-income countries. Additionally, more work is 
needed to agree and standardize common documents. Suggestions were made by our 
respondents for a common AEFI form, for example, that would facilitate consistent 
reporting within, and across, nations. Currently, both CIOMS and EPI forms are used. 
There are many different types of reporting forms and systems in place and countries 
vary in terms of who can access and who can actually report AEFI. 
There are a variety of sources of knowledge of adverse events. Regulators reported 
several different sources of information, including handbooks, but information is 
scattered across several platforms. To date, no harmonized manual is in use which 
would guarantee a common understanding of adverse events (e.g. risks and benefits 
of vaccinations) across sites. A harmonized manual would include, for example, 
all related documents and forms for notification, information on a standard system 
for AEFI surveillance, and definitions for adverse events and how to treat them. 
Regulators stated that manuals should be written in user-friendly language and targeted 
to a range of specific users (e.g. middle- and upper-level health professionals and 
fieldworkers). Both low- and middle-income countries voice the need for a stronger 
commitment from both the government and private sectors for national vaccine safety 
systems. Our study respondents were united in recognizing that need, and in calling 
for international harmonization of AEFI safety procedures. 
4.4 The key barriers for the development of a global vaccine safety system 
are resources and the perception of a lack of ‘political will’ across NRAs 
Regulators of most countries, regardless of whether they were high, middle or low 
income, cited the lack of physical infrastructure and institutional organization as a 
barrier to sufficient and effective AEFI surveillance. Furthermore, lack of electronic 
records (e.g. well documented databases) and quick access to AEFI reports from other 
countries is experienced, particularly in low- and some middle-income countries. 
They see the main challenges to the creation of a global vaccine safety system to 
be a standardized communication network among countries, political will among 
governments, and fully engaged stakeholders. Regulators of all countries were united 
in calling for international harmonization of AEFI safety data collection, reporting, 
and information exchange. They identified the need for strengthening the NRA functions 
and pharmacovigilance centres in all countries. This network would be integral to data 
exchange in a global vaccine safety system. Functional regulatory authorities remain 
a challenge for low-income countries that lack the financial and human resources to 
build the capacities and capabilities necessary for regulatory harmonization.
Global vaccine safety blueprint - The landscape analysis38
5. Limitations
The regulatory survey was sent to a designated regulatory official in the selected 
countries. Our results were dependent on the knowledge and information from those 
officials. Some countries chose to have one individual respond. Other countries had two 
or three different officials working on different sections of the survey, in accordance 
with their particular expertise. Intra-rater reliability was not assessed, nor was inter-rater 
reliability; those surveys that were completed by a single respondent may represent 
that respondent’s particular knowledge. We were not able to corroborate or verify 
their responses. 
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Appendix: Global vaccine safety matrix
Global vaccine safety blueprint - The landscape analysis40
AE
FI
 re
po
rti
ng
 an
d 
po
st
-m
ar
ke
t 
su
rv
eil
lan
ce
Ex
pe
rt 
ad
vic
e
Hu
m
an
 re
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
al 
ca
pa
cit
y
Re
gu
lat
or
-in
du
st
ry
 re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f a
 g
lo
ba
l v
ac
cin
e 
sa
fe
ty
 b
lu
ep
rin
t
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES
AE
FI
 a
re
 id
en
tifi
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
a 
 •
vo
lun
tar
y s
ys
tem
AE
FI
 gu
ide
lin
es
 ar
e n
ot 
re
ad
ily
 
 •
ac
ce
ss
ibl
e f
or
 qu
er
ies
AE
FI
 ar
e r
ep
or
ted
 by
 pa
pe
r
 •
Na
tio
na
l a
nd
 E
PI
 fo
rm
s a
re
 us
ed
 
 •
to 
re
po
rt A
EF
I
AE
FI
 ar
e r
ep
or
ted
 by
 he
alt
h-
 •
ca
re
 pe
rso
nn
el 
(m
ed
ica
l 
do
cto
rs,
 nu
rse
s, 
mi
dw
ive
s a
nd
 
va
cc
ina
tor
s)
He
alt
h-
ca
re
 in
sti
tut
ion
s o
pe
ra
ted
 
 •
by
 na
tio
na
l g
ov
er
nm
en
ts 
ar
e 
re
sp
on
sib
le 
for
 A
EF
I r
ep
or
tin
g 
an
d c
oll
ec
tin
g
Ch
all
en
ge
s t
o r
ep
or
tin
g A
EF
I: 
 •
fea
r o
f a
cc
us
ati
on
; u
nd
er
re
po
rtin
g 
an
d l
ac
k o
f k
no
wl
ed
ge
Ga
ps
 in
 va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y s
ys
tem
s: 
 •
NR
A 
is 
no
t d
ire
ctl
y i
nv
olv
ed
 w
ith
 
the
 pr
es
en
t A
EF
I m
on
ito
rin
g 
sy
ste
m;
 in
ad
eq
ua
te 
kn
ow
led
ge
 of
 
va
rio
us
 A
EF
I
Cr
itic
al 
ele
me
nts
 ne
ce
ss
ar
y f
or
 
 •
re
lia
ble
 re
po
rtin
g a
nd
 su
rve
illa
nc
e 
of 
se
rio
us
 A
EF
I: c
lea
r c
as
e 
de
fin
itio
ns
; i
m
m
un
iza
tio
n 
hi
st
or
y;
 
lab
or
ato
ry 
an
d i
nv
es
tig
ati
on
 
re
po
rts
Ph
ys
ica
l re
so
ur
ce
s n
ee
de
d: 
 •
loc
al 
AE
FI
 fo
rm
s; 
co
mp
ute
rs 
for
 
da
ta 
en
try
 an
d i
nte
rn
et 
ac
ce
ss
; 
co
mp
ute
rs;
 su
ita
ble
 da
tab
as
e 
an
d t
ra
ine
d s
taf
f
AE
FI
 ba
rri
er
s: 
pa
pe
r f
or
ms
 ha
ve
 
 •
to 
be
 sc
an
ne
d a
nd
 se
nt 
by
 em
ail
; 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
of
 n
ot
ific
at
io
n 
ca
us
ed
 
by
 lo
w 
int
er
ne
t s
pe
ed
; la
ck
 of
 
na
tio
na
l c
om
mi
tte
e f
or
 A
EF
I 
ca
us
ali
ty 
as
se
ss
me
nt
Al
l c
ou
ntr
ies
 ha
ve
 na
tio
na
l 
 •
ad
ve
rse
 ev
en
t r
ev
iew
 co
mm
itte
es
Co
nfi
de
nt
ia
lly
 is
su
es
 a
m
on
g 
 •
ex
pe
rts
Al
l c
ou
ntr
ies
 ha
ve
 ac
ce
ss
 
 •
to 
ex
pe
rts
 na
tio
na
lly
 an
d 
int
er
na
tio
na
lly
Na
tio
na
l a
dv
er
se
 ev
en
ts 
re
vie
w 
 •
co
mm
itte
e m
em
be
rs 
ar
e b
as
ed
 in
 
cli
nic
al 
pr
ac
tic
e a
nd
 ac
ad
em
ia
Co
un
trie
s a
ble
 to
 im
ple
me
nt 
 •
su
gg
es
tio
ns
 of
 a 
na
tio
na
l a
dv
er
se
 
ev
en
ts 
re
vie
w 
co
mm
itte
e
Ex
ter
na
l e
xp
er
ts 
ar
e c
all
ed
 w
he
n 
 •
na
tio
na
l e
xp
er
ts 
ar
e u
na
ble
 to
 
ide
nti
fy,
 de
tec
t o
r a
na
lys
e A
EF
I 
an
d w
he
n v
ac
cin
es
 ar
e n
ot 
W
HO
 
pr
eq
ua
lifi
ed
NR
As
 co
ns
ult
 w
ith
 ot
he
r c
ou
ntr
ies
 
 •
wh
en
 th
er
e a
re
 qu
ali
ty 
or
 sa
fet
y 
co
nc
er
ns
 ab
ou
t th
e v
ac
cin
es
Inf
ra
str
uc
tur
al 
re
so
ur
ce
s n
ee
de
d: 
 •
lan
d; 
bu
ild
ing
s; 
uti
lity
 se
rvi
ce
s; 
na
tio
na
l c
on
tro
l la
bo
ra
tor
y; 
co
m
pu
te
riz
ed
 s
ys
te
m
s;
 q
ua
lifi
ed
 
pe
rso
nn
el
Su
gg
es
ted
 ro
le 
for
 N
RA
s: 
1)
 
 •
NR
A 
ha
s t
he
 so
le 
re
sp
on
sib
ilit
y 
for
 en
su
rin
g r
eg
ist
ra
tio
n a
nd
 
lic
en
sin
g o
f a
ny
 va
cc
ine
s t
o b
e 
im
po
rte
d o
r m
an
ufa
ctu
re
d l
oc
all
y 
by
 la
w;
 2)
 co
lle
ct 
da
ta 
an
d t
ra
in 
he
alt
h-
ca
re
 pe
rso
nn
el
Va
cc
ine
 m
an
ufa
ctu
re
s m
ee
t 
 •
wi
th 
he
alt
h r
eg
ula
tor
s b
efo
re
 
su
bm
iss
io
n 
of
 in
te
nt
 to
 fi
le
 a
 n
ew
 
va
cc
ine
Me
eti
ng
s w
ith
 va
cc
ine
 
 •
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s a
re
 tr
igg
er
ed
 by
 
fau
lty
 pr
od
uc
t/lo
w 
qu
ali
ty
Me
eti
ng
s w
ith
 va
cc
ine
 
 •
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s a
re
 pe
rce
ive
d t
o 
be
 us
efu
l 
Va
cc
ine
 m
an
ufa
ctu
re
rs 
pr
ov
ide
 
 •
lim
ite
d s
up
po
rt 
to 
low
-in
co
me
 
co
un
trie
s
NR
As
 co
lla
bo
ra
te 
wi
th 
ind
us
try
 
 •
wh
en
 th
e g
ov
er
nm
en
t te
sti
ng
 
lab
or
ato
ry 
is 
un
ab
le 
to 
co
nd
uc
t 
a s
pe
cia
l te
st 
an
d t
he
re
 ar
e 
ac
tiv
itie
s i
n c
on
ne
cti
on
 w
ith
 
the
 de
ve
lop
me
nt 
of 
the
 A
EF
I 
su
rve
illa
nc
e s
ys
tem
Co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n w
ith
 in
du
str
y 
 •
as
su
me
s t
he
 fo
rm
 of
 tr
ain
ing
  
(e
.g.
 w
or
ks
ho
ps
)
Me
eti
ng
 w
ith
 va
cc
ine
 
 •
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s i
s r
eq
ue
ste
d b
y 
he
alt
h-
ca
re
 au
tho
riti
es
 (e
.g.
 
Mi
nis
try
 of
 H
ea
lth
 or
 N
RA
 if 
the
re
 
is 
on
e)
 
Ex
pe
cta
tio
ns
 fr
om
 a 
glo
ba
l 
 •
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y s
ys
tem
 in
clu
de
: 
pr
ov
ide
 so
ur
ce
s o
f in
for
ma
tio
n; 
up
da
te 
lin
ks
 to
 ot
he
r m
or
e 
str
ing
en
t r
eg
ula
tor
s f
or
 
inf
or
ma
tio
n; 
re
inf
or
cin
g e
ffo
rts
 to
 
co
ntr
ol 
co
un
ter
fei
t v
ac
cin
es
Ch
all
en
ge
s f
or
 th
e c
re
ati
on
 of
 
 •
a g
lob
al 
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y s
ys
tem
 
inc
lud
e: 
im
pr
ov
ing
 co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n 
ov
er
 v
ac
cin
e 
lic
en
sin
g;
 fi
na
nc
ia
lly
 
we
ak
 co
un
trie
s n
ee
d t
o b
e 
su
pp
or
ted
 by
 th
e r
ich
er
 co
un
trie
s 
by
 pr
ov
idi
ng
 fr
ee
 te
ch
nic
al 
kn
ow
-
ho
w 
for
 pr
od
uc
tio
n a
nd
 qu
ali
ty 
co
ntr
ol 
of 
va
cc
ine
s
Na
tio
na
l v
ac
cin
e s
afe
ty 
sy
ste
ms
 
 •
ca
n b
e i
mp
ro
ve
d b
y e
sta
bli
sh
ing
 
fun
cti
on
al 
NR
As
; tr
ain
ed
 hu
ma
n 
re
so
ur
ce
s a
ss
ign
ed
 to
 de
ali
ng
 
wi
th 
AE
FI
. C
ha
lle
ng
es
 in
 m
ak
ing
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts 
inc
lud
e: 
po
liti
ca
l 
co
mm
itm
en
t; c
lea
r g
uid
eli
ne
s a
nd
 
ac
tio
n p
lan
 im
ple
me
nta
tio
n 
41WHO/IVB/12.04
AE
FI
 re
po
rti
ng
 an
d 
po
st
-m
ar
ke
t 
su
rv
eil
lan
ce
Ex
pe
rt 
ad
vic
e
Hu
m
an
 re
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
al 
ca
pa
cit
y
Re
gu
lat
or
-in
du
st
ry
 re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f a
 g
lo
ba
l v
ac
cin
e 
sa
fe
ty
 b
lu
ep
rin
t
MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES
	
	•
Mo
st 
co
un
trie
s i
de
nti
fy 
AE
FI
 
thr
ou
gh
 pa
ss
ive
 su
rve
illa
nc
e 
sy
ste
ms
Al
l c
ou
ntr
ies
 ha
ve
 na
tio
na
l 
 •
gu
ide
lin
es
 fo
r A
EF
I s
ur
ve
illa
nc
e
AE
FI
 su
rve
illa
nc
e g
uid
eli
ne
s a
re
 
 •
av
ail
ab
le 
in 
ele
ctr
on
ic 
for
m 
for
 
mo
st 
co
un
trie
s
Mo
st 
co
un
trie
s s
ay
 th
ey
 ha
ve
 a 
 •
sin
gle
 na
tio
na
l s
tru
ctu
re
d a
nd
 
pr
e-
co
de
d A
EF
I r
ep
or
t fo
rm
 
(d
es
ign
ed
 by
 E
PI
 or
 C
IO
MS
)
Ins
titu
tio
ns
 re
sp
on
sib
le 
for
 A
EF
I 
 •
re
po
rtin
g a
nd
 da
ta 
co
lle
cti
on
 
inc
lud
e: 
Mi
nis
try
 of
 H
ea
lth
 
(B
eli
ze
), 
Na
tio
n C
om
mi
tte
e 
of 
AE
FI
 (I
nd
on
es
ia)
, N
ati
on
al 
Ph
ar
ma
ce
uti
ca
l C
on
tro
l 
Bu
re
au
 (M
ala
ys
ia)
, N
ati
on
al 
Ad
ve
rse
 D
ru
g R
ep
or
tin
g C
en
tre
 
(S
ou
th 
Af
ric
a)
, a
nd
 B
ur
ea
u o
f 
Ep
ide
mi
olo
gy
 (T
ha
ila
nd
) 
Ch
all
en
ge
s i
n r
ep
or
tin
g A
EF
I 
 •
inc
lud
e: 
un
de
rre
po
rtin
g o
f m
ino
r 
re
ac
tio
ns
; l
ac
k 
of
 q
ua
lifi
ed
 
pe
rso
nn
el;
 tim
eli
ne
ss
 an
d l
ate
 
re
po
rtin
g
Th
e m
ain
 ba
rri
er
 th
at 
un
de
rm
ine
s 
 •
AE
FI
 su
rve
illa
nc
e s
ys
tem
s i
s 
“fe
ar
 of
 re
po
rtin
g”
	
	•
Mo
st 
co
un
trie
s h
av
e n
ati
on
al 
ad
ve
rse
 ev
en
t r
ev
iew
 co
mm
itte
es
Ve
ry 
few
 co
un
trie
s h
av
e 
 •
co
nfi
de
nt
ia
lity
 is
su
es
 a
m
on
g 
ex
pe
rts
Ex
pe
rtis
e r
eq
uir
ed
 to
 op
er
ate
 
 •
a n
ati
on
al 
ad
ve
rse
 re
vie
w 
co
mm
itte
e i
s a
va
ila
ble
 na
tio
na
lly
Ex
pe
rts
 av
ail
ab
le 
na
tio
na
lly
 
 •
ar
e b
as
ed
 in
 un
ive
rsi
tie
s a
nd
 in
 
cli
nic
al 
pr
ac
tic
e
Ex
pe
rt 
ad
vic
e 
is 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 
 •
im
ple
me
nt 
du
e t
o i
nfr
as
tru
ctu
ra
l 
an
d i
ns
titu
tio
na
l fa
cto
rs
Ex
ter
na
l e
xp
er
ts 
ar
e c
all
ed
 w
he
n 
 •
de
ath
 oc
cu
rs,
 ev
er
y t
im
e a
 ne
w 
va
cc
ine
 is
 re
gis
ter
ed
NR
As
 co
ns
ult
 w
ith
 ot
he
r 
 •
co
un
trie
s w
he
n t
he
re
 ar
e 
pr
ob
lem
s w
ith
 va
cc
ine
s a
nd
 w
he
n 
cri
tic
al 
de
cis
ion
s o
n n
ati
on
al 
im
mu
niz
ati
on
 ne
ed
s n
ee
d t
o b
e 
de
sig
ne
d a
nd
 im
ple
me
nte
d
	
	•
Ex
pe
rts
 av
ail
ab
le 
na
tio
na
lly
Ve
ry 
few
 co
un
trie
s d
ete
rm
ine
d 
 •
an
d 
de
fin
ed
 “m
in
im
al
 c
ap
ac
ity
” i
n 
ter
ms
 of
 pe
rso
nn
el
La
ck
 o
f m
ot
iva
te
d 
qu
al
ifie
d 
 •
pr
ofe
ss
ion
als
Inf
ra
str
uc
tur
al 
an
d c
ap
ac
ity
 
 •
re
so
ur
ce
s n
ee
de
d: 
tra
ine
d 
pe
rso
nn
el;
 be
tte
r in
for
ma
tio
n 
an
d c
om
mu
nic
ati
on
 te
ch
no
log
y; 
co
ns
tru
cti
on
 of
 a 
na
tio
na
l v
ac
cin
e 
sto
re
 de
sig
ne
d f
or
 st
oc
k i
nta
ke
 
an
d i
ss
ua
nc
e; 
ap
pr
op
ria
te 
co
ld 
bo
xe
s f
or
 tr
an
sp
or
tat
ion
Su
gg
es
ted
 ro
le 
for
 N
RA
s: 
sa
fet
y 
 •
ev
alu
ati
on
; r
isk
 m
an
ag
em
en
t; 
ris
k m
itig
ati
on
; A
EF
I m
on
ito
rin
g 
sig
na
l d
ete
cti
on
; m
on
ito
rin
g 
an
d s
ur
ve
illa
nc
e o
f v
ac
cin
e 
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s
Va
cc
ine
 m
an
ufa
ctu
re
rs 
me
et 
wi
th 
 •
the
 N
RA
 be
for
e t
he
 su
bm
iss
ion
 of
 
in
te
nt
 to
 fi
le
 a
 n
ew
 v
ac
cin
e
Me
eti
ng
s a
re
 re
qu
es
ted
 w
ith
 
 •
va
cc
ine
 m
an
ufa
ctu
re
rs 
if t
he
re
 
ar
e v
iol
ati
on
s o
f G
MP
 th
at 
re
su
lts
 
in 
un
re
lia
ble
 qu
ali
ty 
va
cc
ine
Co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n w
ith
 in
du
str
y 
 •
as
su
me
s t
he
 fo
rm
 of
 tr
ain
ing
 (e
.g.
 
co
nfe
re
nc
es
 an
d w
or
ks
ho
ps
)
NR
As
 co
lla
bo
ra
te 
wi
th 
ind
us
try
 
 •
wh
en
 ne
w 
gu
ide
lin
es
 ar
e 
be
ing
 de
ve
lop
ed
; d
isc
us
sio
n 
an
d 
cla
rifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 c
om
pl
ai
nt
s 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 s
pe
cifi
c 
pr
od
uc
ts
 a
nd
 
wh
en
 A
EF
I c
as
es
 ne
ed
 to
 be
 
inv
es
tig
ate
d f
ur
the
r
Me
eti
ng
s w
ith
 va
cc
ine
 
 •
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s a
re
 re
qu
es
ted
 by
 
NR
As
Co
mm
un
ica
tio
n w
ith
 va
cc
ine
 
 •
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s t
ak
es
 pl
ac
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
of
fic
ia
l le
tte
rs
, e
m
ai
l, 
fa
x 
an
d t
ele
co
nfe
re
nc
ing
 
W
he
n 
co
nfl
ict
s 
of
 in
te
re
st
 
 •
ar
ise
, th
es
e a
re
 se
nt 
to 
eth
ics
 
co
mm
itte
es
 an
d t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y i
s 
re
qu
es
ted
 by
 N
RA
s
Ex
pe
cta
tio
ns
 fr
om
 a 
glo
ba
l 
 •
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y s
ys
tem
 in
clu
de
: 
to 
fac
ilit
ate
 fa
st 
ex
ch
an
ge
 of
 
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y i
nfo
rm
ati
on
 ac
ro
ss
 
co
un
trie
s; 
as
su
ra
nc
e t
ha
t a
ll 
va
cc
in
es
 a
re
 p
re
qu
al
ifie
d 
be
fo
re
 
lic
en
sin
g f
or
 pu
bli
c u
sa
ge
; to
 
pr
ov
ide
 as
sis
tan
ce
 an
d g
uid
an
ce
 
Ch
all
en
ge
s f
or
 th
e c
re
ati
on
 
 •
of 
a g
lob
al 
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y 
sy
ste
m 
inc
lud
e: 
po
liti
ca
l w
ill 
am
on
g g
ov
er
nm
en
ts;
 ge
ttin
g 
sta
ke
ho
lde
rs 
to 
be
 fu
lly
 in
vo
lve
d 
wi
th
 th
e 
sy
st
em
; l
ac
k 
of
 q
ua
lifi
ed
/
sk
ille
d p
er
so
nn
el 
Na
tio
na
l v
ac
cin
e s
afe
ty 
sy
ste
ms
 
 •
ca
n b
e i
mp
ro
ve
d b
y: 
for
mi
ng
 
a w
ell
-st
ru
ctu
re
d r
eg
ula
tor
y 
bo
dy
; e
ffe
cti
ve
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
dis
trib
uti
on
 sy
ste
m;
 co
nti
nu
ity
 
of 
pr
ofe
ss
ion
als
; w
ell
-e
qu
ipp
ed
 
he
alt
h-
ca
re
 fa
cil
itie
s; 
thr
ou
gh
 a 
glo
ba
l h
ar
mo
niz
ati
on
 of
 an
 A
EF
I 
sy
ste
m.
 C
ha
lle
ng
es
 in
 m
ak
ing
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts 
inc
lud
e: 
po
liti
ca
l 
wi
ll; 
co
nfl
ict
 o
f i
nt
er
es
t; 
lim
ite
d 
fun
din
g
Global vaccine safety blueprint - The landscape analysis42
AE
FI
 re
po
rti
ng
 an
d 
po
st
-m
ar
ke
t 
su
rv
eil
lan
ce
Ex
pe
rt 
ad
vic
e
Hu
m
an
 re
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
al 
ca
pa
cit
y
Re
gu
lat
or
-in
du
st
ry
 re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f a
 g
lo
ba
l v
ac
cin
e 
sa
fe
ty
 b
lu
ep
rin
t
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES
AE
FI
 fo
rm
s c
an
 be
 su
bm
itte
d b
y 
 •
an
yo
ne
Hi
gh
-in
co
me
 co
un
trie
s d
o n
ot 
 •
re
ce
ive
 no
r c
oll
ec
t A
EF
I d
ata
 
dir
ec
tly
 fr
om
 pr
oc
ur
ing
 or
 lo
w-
 
inc
om
e c
ou
ntr
ies
Th
e M
ar
ke
tin
g A
uth
or
iza
tio
n 
 •
Ho
lde
r is
 re
qu
ire
d t
o c
oll
ec
t A
EF
I 
da
ta 
fro
m 
pr
oc
ur
ing
 co
un
trie
s a
nd
 
pr
ep
ar
e p
er
iod
ic 
sa
fet
y u
pd
ate
 
re
po
rts
 (P
SU
Rs
)
AE
FI
 fr
om
 pr
oc
ur
ing
 co
un
trie
s 
 •
ar
e r
ep
or
ted
 vi
a t
he
 m
an
ufa
ctu
re
r 
on
ly
Mo
st 
co
un
trie
s d
o n
ot 
tra
ck
 th
e 
 •
AE
FI
 of
 va
cc
ine
s o
nc
e t
he
y h
av
e 
be
en
 ex
po
rte
d
AE
FI
 c
as
es
 a
re
 id
en
tifi
ed
 v
ia
 
 •
pa
ss
ive
 su
rve
illa
nc
e t
hr
ou
gh
 
pu
bli
c- 
he
alt
h a
uth
or
itie
s
Hi
gh
-in
co
me
 co
un
trie
s d
o n
ot 
 •
pr
ov
ide
 as
sis
tan
ce
 to
 pr
oc
ur
ing
 
an
d l
ow
-in
co
me
 co
un
trie
s
AE
FI
 gu
ide
lin
es
 ar
e a
va
ila
ble
 
 •
on
lin
e
AE
FI
 re
po
rts
 ar
e s
ub
mi
tte
d 
 •
by
 pa
pe
r, i
nte
rn
et,
 w
eb
sit
es
, 
tel
ep
ho
ne
 an
d f
ax
Mo
st 
co
un
trie
s h
av
e m
or
e t
ha
n 
 •
on
e A
EF
I fo
rm
Mo
st 
co
un
trie
s f
ac
e c
ha
lle
ng
es
 
 •
as
so
cia
ted
 w
ith
 pa
ss
ive
 
su
rve
illa
nc
e/r
ep
or
tin
g s
ys
tem
s
Ke
y g
ap
s i
n A
EF
I s
ur
ve
illa
nc
e/ 
 •
re
po
rtin
g s
ys
tem
s: 
lim
ite
d 
im
mu
niz
ati
on
 re
gis
try
 sy
ste
ms
 
an
d e
lec
tro
nic
 m
ed
ica
l re
co
rd
s; 
lac
k o
f a
 co
ns
ist
en
t n
ati
on
all
y 
ag
re
ed
 re
po
rtin
g f
or
m
W
ith
 th
e e
xc
ep
tio
n o
f E
sto
nia
, 
 •
the
se
 co
un
trie
s h
av
e n
ati
on
al 
ad
ve
rse
 ev
en
ts 
re
vie
w 
co
mm
itte
es
 (a
lso
 kn
ow
n a
s 
ad
vis
or
y c
om
mi
tte
es
)
Na
tio
na
l a
dv
er
se
 ev
en
ts 
re
vie
w 
 •
co
mm
itte
e m
em
be
rs 
ar
e b
as
ed
 
in 
ac
ad
em
ia,
 cl
ini
ca
l p
ra
cti
ce
 an
d 
go
ve
rn
me
nt
Ex
pe
rt 
ad
vic
e 
is 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 
 •
im
ple
me
nt 
du
e t
o r
es
ou
rce
 
lim
ita
tio
ns
Ex
pe
rts
 ar
e f
ro
m 
ac
ad
em
ia,
 
 •
cli
nic
al 
pr
ac
tic
e a
nd
 re
gu
lat
or
y 
se
cto
rs
Ex
ter
na
l e
xp
er
ts 
ar
e r
ar
ely
 us
ed
 •
Ex
ter
na
l e
xp
er
ts 
ar
e c
all
ed
 w
he
n 
 •
ca
us
al
ity
 is
 d
ou
bt
fu
l, 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 
re
lat
e t
o t
he
 pr
od
uc
t a
nd
 w
he
n 
the
 co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 of
 th
e d
ec
isi
on
 
ha
ve
 po
lic
y a
nd
/or
 gu
ida
nc
e 
im
pli
ca
tio
ns
NR
As
 co
ns
ult
 w
ith
 ot
he
r c
ou
ntr
ies
 
 •
in 
or
de
r t
o d
isc
us
s s
afe
ty 
sig
na
ls 
an
d g
lob
al 
pu
bli
c-h
ea
lth
 
co
nc
er
ns
.
Ex
pe
rtis
e i
s a
va
ila
ble
 na
tio
na
lly
 •
Inf
ra
str
uc
tur
al 
re
so
ur
ce
s n
ee
de
d: 
 •
me
mo
ra
nd
um
s o
f u
nd
er
sta
nd
ing
 
wi
th 
pu
bli
c- 
he
alt
h a
ge
nc
ies
; 
re
lia
ble
 da
tab
as
es
 an
d s
ign
al 
an
aly
sis
 an
d s
tat
ist
ica
l s
kil
ls
Su
gg
es
ted
 ro
le 
for
 N
RA
s: 
 •
co
lle
cti
ng
; m
on
ito
rin
g a
nd
 
as
se
ss
ing
 al
l s
afe
ty-
re
lat
ed
 
inf
or
ma
tio
n s
ub
mi
tte
d b
y t
he
 
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s; 
ma
kin
g s
afe
ty 
inf
or
ma
tio
n a
va
ila
ble
; p
ro
vid
e 
ex
pe
rt 
ad
vic
e o
n w
eig
ht 
of 
ev
ide
nc
e o
f s
ign
als
 de
tec
ted
 
thr
ou
gh
 th
e m
on
ito
rin
g s
ys
tem
W
ith
 th
e e
xc
ep
tio
n o
f F
ra
nc
e, 
 •
no
 hi
gh
-in
co
me
 co
un
try
 ha
s 
ex
pli
cit
ly 
sta
ted
 th
at 
va
cc
ine
 
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s m
ee
t th
e r
eg
ula
tor
 
be
fo
re
 s
ub
m
iss
io
n 
of
 in
te
nt
 to
 fi
le
 
a n
ew
 va
cc
ine
 ap
pli
ca
tio
n
Ad
dit
ion
al 
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y 
 •
inf
or
ma
tio
n i
s r
eq
ue
ste
d o
n a
 
ca
se
-b
y-c
as
e b
as
is
Me
eti
ng
s w
ith
 va
cc
ine
 
 •
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s w
he
n t
he
re
 ar
e 
iss
ue
s i
n q
ua
lity
 co
ntr
ol 
tha
t m
igh
t 
ha
ve
 an
 im
pa
ct 
on
 th
e s
afe
ty 
an
d/
or
 e
ffi
ca
cy
/e
ffe
ct
ive
ne
ss
 o
f 
the
 va
cc
ine
 an
d w
he
ne
ve
r t
he
 
co
st
/b
en
efi
t r
at
io
 o
f a
 v
ac
cin
e 
is 
in 
qu
es
tio
n f
or
 re
as
on
s o
f s
afe
ty
Me
eti
ng
s w
ith
 m
an
ufa
ctu
re
rs 
ar
e 
 •
re
po
rte
d t
o b
e v
er
y u
se
ful
Co
un
trie
s h
av
e s
ys
tem
s f
or
 
 •
pr
ov
idi
ng
 an
d r
ec
eiv
ing
 fe
ed
ba
ck
 
on
 sa
fet
y i
nfo
rm
ati
on
 
NR
As
 do
 no
t r
ec
eiv
e s
up
po
rt 
 •
fro
m 
va
cc
ine
 m
an
ufa
ctu
re
rs
Co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n w
ith
 va
cc
ine
 
 •
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s a
ss
um
es
 th
e 
for
m 
of 
a r
ou
nd
tab
le 
to 
dis
cu
ss
 
on
go
ing
 re
gu
lat
or
y i
ss
ue
s o
f 
int
er
es
t to
 th
e i
nd
us
try
NR
As
 ex
pe
ct 
ma
nu
fac
tur
er
s t
o 
 •
re
sp
on
d t
im
ely
 an
d r
ap
idl
y 
Mo
st 
co
un
trie
s h
av
e g
uid
eli
ne
s t
o 
 •
de
al
 w
ith
 c
on
flic
t o
f i
nt
er
es
t
Ex
pe
cta
tio
ns
 fr
om
 a 
glo
ba
l 
 •
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y s
ys
tem
 in
clu
de
: 
ea
sy
, tr
an
sp
ar
en
t s
ha
rin
g o
f 
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y i
nfo
rm
ati
on
; e
ar
ly 
ale
rt 
sy
ste
m;
 tim
ely
 in
for
ma
tio
n 
on
 s
af
et
y-
iss
ue
s 
id
en
tifi
ed
; 
ha
rm
on
iza
tio
n 
Ch
all
en
ge
s f
or
 th
e c
re
ati
on
 of
 
 •
a g
lob
al 
va
cc
ine
 sa
fet
y s
ys
tem
 
inc
lud
e: 
ag
re
em
en
t o
n t
he
 
sta
nd
ar
ds
 to
 be
 ap
pli
ed
 an
d 
fun
din
g a
va
ila
bil
ity
; c
ap
ac
ity
 
bu
ild
ing
 in
 de
ve
lop
ing
 co
un
trie
s; 
me
mo
ra
nd
um
 of
 un
de
rst
an
din
g 
fo
r s
ha
rin
g 
co
nfi
de
nt
ia
l 
inf
or
ma
tio
n; 
co
mp
ati
ble
 re
po
rtin
g 
sy
ste
ms
 fo
r e
ntr
y i
nto
 da
tab
as
e, 
an
d e
ns
ur
ing
 th
at 
va
cc
ine
s r
ea
ch
 
the
 po
pu
lat
ion
s i
nte
nd
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
inf
or
ma
tio
n n
ec
es
sa
ry 
to 
en
su
re
 
the
ir s
afe
ty
Na
tio
na
l v
ac
cin
e s
afe
ty 
sy
ste
m 
 •
ca
n b
e i
mp
ro
ve
d b
y: 
da
ta 
lin
ka
ge
; n
ati
on
all
y c
on
sis
ten
t 
re
po
rtin
g f
or
m 
an
d p
ro
ce
ss
es
; 
im
ple
me
nta
tio
n o
f a
n a
cti
ve
 
su
rve
illa
nc
e s
ys
tem
; m
or
e 
ne
tw
or
kin
g 
an
d 
be
tte
r d
efi
ni
tio
n 
of 
co
mm
un
ica
tio
ns
 pr
oc
es
s
Ch
all
en
ge
s i
n m
ak
ing
 
 •
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts 
inc
lud
e r
es
ist
an
ce
 
to 
ch
an
ge
, a
nd
 la
ck
 of
 ac
ce
ss
 to
 
ad
mi
nis
tra
tiv
e e
lec
tro
nic
 da
ta
43WHO/IVB/12.04
AE
FI
 re
po
rti
ng
 an
d 
po
st
-m
ar
ke
t 
su
rv
eil
lan
ce
Ex
pe
rt 
ad
vic
e
Hu
m
an
 re
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
al 
ca
pa
cit
y
Re
gu
lat
or
-in
du
st
ry
 re
lat
io
ns
hi
ps
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f a
 g
lo
ba
l v
ac
cin
e 
sa
fe
ty
 b
lu
ep
rin
t
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES
Ph
ys
ica
l re
so
ur
ce
s n
ec
es
sa
ry 
 •
for
 A
EF
I: I
T 
su
pp
or
t; c
lea
r 
gu
ide
lin
es
; r
eg
ion
al 
an
d n
ati
on
al 
co
lle
ct
io
n 
ce
nt
re
s;
 n
ot
ific
at
io
n 
for
ms
Ba
rri
er
s f
or
 im
ple
me
nti
ng
 A
EF
I 
 •
re
po
rtin
g s
tan
da
rd
s: 
tra
ini
ng
; 
vo
lun
tar
y r
ep
or
tin
g; 
lac
k o
f 
sta
nd
ar
diz
ed
 A
EF
I
Ne
ed
s f
or
 a 
re
lia
ble
 A
EF
I 
 •
re
po
rtin
g i
nc
lud
e: 
ag
re
ed
 
re
po
rtin
g f
or
ma
t; m
ult
ipl
e 
str
ea
ml
ine
d w
ay
s t
o r
ep
or
t;  
ac
tiv
e 
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
of
 s
pe
cifi
c 
AE
FI
, a
nd
 m
or
e a
wa
re
ne
ss
 
am
on
g h
ea
lth
 pr
ofe
ss
ion
als
Global vaccine safety blueprint - The landscape analysis44
Executive summary
As part of the WHO vaccine safety blueprint project, between mid-June and 
mid-July 2010, ii4sm conducted a survey of vaccine manufacturers, both multinational 
and from developing countries. The survey gathered important information about 
vaccine post-marketing surveillance systems, the flow of information between 
companies and regulatory authorities, and the expectations for a global vaccine safety 
partnership within developing countries. This document describes the results of the 
survey, with descriptive analyses. It was not the purpose of the survey to perform a 
quantitative analysis, hence such questions as, numbers of vaccines sold or number 
the AEFIs received from low- and middle-income countries, were not included in the 
questionnaire.
1. Introduction
This describes and summarizes the results of the WHO survey of vaccine manufacturers, 
to characterize the value and limitation of vaccine safety data available through their 
system, and to gather their perspective on the need for a global vaccine safety system, 
including their possible role in such a system. This baseline survey addressed the 
following elements:
a description of the vaccine post-marketing surveillance systems available to large •	
manufacturers of vaccines for global programmes;
an analysis of the flow of information between the manufacturers and regulatory •	
authorities in producing and procuring countries;
a survey of manufacturers’ expectations for a global vaccine safety partnership, •	
including an analysis of possible models of collaboration between the public 
sector and industry.
The survey addressed the 12 largest vaccine manufacturers — six multinational 
companies and six companies from developing countries. The survey was a web-based 
questionnaire divided into three separate topics, and was conducted between mid-June 
and mid-July 2010. The major outcomes of the survey are presented in the results 
section. The Appendix contains the survey questions with summarized and graphically 
displayed responses.
Survey of vaccine manufacturers
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2. Results
Of the 12 vaccine manufacturers (six multinational companies and six companies from 
emerging markets), 11 participated in the survey. One multinational company did not 
respond. 
2.1 Overview
The survey was set up to obtain a description of vaccine post-marketing surveillance 
systems and potential issues applicable to large manufacturers of vaccines for global 
programmes. In addition, the survey seeks to analyse the flow of information between 
the manufacturers and regulatory authorities, and the manufacturers’ expectations 
for a global vaccine safety partnership, including possible models of cooperation 
between public and private sectors. The web-based survey was addressed to 
12 large vaccine manufacturers, six multinational and six from developing countries. 
However, one multinational company did not participate in the survey  
(without specifying the reasons), giving a slight imbalance in favour of the vaccine 
manufacturers from developing countries. Overall, the results are in line with 
expectations, and showed that vaccine manufacturers are interested in improved safety 
data from low- and middle-income countries. It might be worthwhile to develop a 
more detailed questionnaire, based on the responses shown in this survey, to facilitate 
a quantitative evaluation.
2.1.1 Summary Topic 1
Post-marketing surveillance system and flow of information between the manufac-
turer and regulatory authorities
All vaccine manufacturers have post-marketing surveillance systems in place for 
capturing AEFIs. These systems are paper-based or electronic systems, either from a 
commercial source or the company’s own in-house system. The regional distribution 
of actual captured spontaneous adverse events for a vaccine per year, is heterogeneous, 
depending on the size and market penetration of the company; spontaneous reporting 
from north and southern Africa, for instance, is particularly sparse. The sources of 
information that input into the pharmacovigilance system is either through government 
immunization programmes or through commercial distribution. The majority of 
companies use both sources of information. Only one company from emerging markets 
uses a non-governmental, non-commercial source of information, and this is a vaccine 
safety advisory committee. 
All vaccine manufacturers have procedures for case management and plans for 
urgent notification in place (e.g. change in labelling, healthcare professional letter), 
or implementations of restriction of use due to newly perceived risks, as evidenced from 
their process details provided. The companies have different ways of dealing with the 
eventuality that a report associates a vaccine with three deaths. Their responses depended 
on whether the vaccine is directly marketed in a country by the company itself, or is 
distributed through an official programme (EPI) of a non-governmental organization 
(NGO). In the first instance, a designated contact person would be responsible for 
collecting and communicating the data, with some of companies having a centralized 
procedure in place to share the data in expedited fashion with the national-health 
authorities, ethical committees and relevant company departments. In the second 
instance, where the vaccine is distributed through an EPI, the case data would be 
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communicated by the official organization. There seems to be room for improvement 
regarding the timeliness and formal way of communication from the NGO to the 
vaccine manufacturer. However, it was pointed out that the role of the WHO is critical 
in reporting AEFIs in these countries to manufacturers. 
Companies are almost equally divided on the question of whether there are differences 
or not between countries regarding the reporting and investigating of adverse events. 
However, twice as many companies from emerging markets than multinational 
companies find differences between countries. Multinational companies could 
have more centralized processes installed than companies from emerging markets 
that could alleviate some of the perceived country-by-country variations. Plus, if a 
company perceives reporting and investigating of AEFIs as equally good or poor in 
several countries, then the company would not report variations between countries. 
Therefore, the proportion of responding may reflect the rationale as to how the 
respondent made the baseline assumption.
A greater role for the WHO would be welcomed to intervene in countries where there 
is perceived unwillingness of the national health authorities to cooperate. 
Companies are also divided on the question of whether the pharmacovigilance 
regulations in low- and middle-income countries are being used, are clear and up-to-
date. This seems to be mostly dependent on the development status of the country, with 
developed countries like Brazil, China and India, Malaysia and Thailand being named 
as having clear and up-to-date pharmacovigilance regulations in place. Surprisingly, 
Bangladesh is also mentioned, but here the reporting is through the WHO. All in all, 
the results should be interpreted with caution, as some companies had only experience 
with pharmacovigilance regulations in their home country and, hence, knew the 
local conditions best. Interestingly, India is cited as an example where spontaneous 
reporting of adverse events is rather rare. In addition, some multinational companies 
state that, in the majority of low- and middle-income countries, no pharmacovigilance 
regulations exist. There is an enormous need to improve, keep up-to-date and even to 
establish pharmacovigilance regulations in most of the low-and middle-income 
countries. This could be facilitated through the WHO as an independent and recognized 
authority. 
As expected, all vaccine manufacturers declare to ensure patient confidentiality. Most of 
the companies have risk minimization plans based on pharmacovigilance data installed 
either globally, or dependent on the country or product. 
The majority of the vaccine manufacturers have access to an external database that 
could be used for capturing AEFIs; however these sources are employed for validating 
or testing safety signals. In low- and middle-income countries, there does not seem to 
be access to such databases available. 
The majority of companies do not have a checklist of roles and responsibilities available 
from a previous or ongoing vaccine safety surveillance system in a developing country. 
However, it might be that the companies are only referring to their relationship to 
NGOs, as it is most unlikely that multinational companies do not have lists in place 
of roles and responsibilities for contacts and activities. This lack of clear definition 
of roles and responsibilities among manufacturers, NRAs and NGOs, or other 
organizations, underscores the global, regional and country level needs of coordinating 
pharmacovigilance effort among the stakeholders involved. 
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2.1.2 Summary Topic 2
Based on experience in developed countries that could be adapted for developing 
countries 
Although most vaccine manufacturers think that a global harmonization of AEFI 
forms can be achieved, it is more important for them to standardize common fields 
and agree on a minimum level of completeness acceptable to all stakeholders. Areas 
difficult to harmonize are: data collection; reported event terms; definition of AEFI; 
medical review and management; causality assessment; standard of care; terminology; 
patient’s vaccination history; vaccine source, and regional levels in the quality of 
reporting that would need a strong involvement by WHO and other stakeholders 
for harmonization. These areas could be used as a basis for developing a strategy for 
harmonization of vaccine-safety issues. 
Interestingly, the vaccine adverse event form that was developed by the Brighton 
Collaboration is rarely used by companies and, if used, it is rather for data categorizing 
and analysis than for data collection. Therefore, it seems that any harmonization effort 
of datafields could not use an existing set of datafields, but would require discussion 
with all relevant stakeholders to come to an agreement. The question of granting legal 
authority to companies for an autonomous AEFI investigation gave a mixed result, 
suggesting that the implication of the question, at least in part, was not well understood; 
hence it is hard to draw any meaningful conclusion from it. By contrast, there was 
complete agreement that the manufacturer should participate in the investigation of 
an AEFI related to its product. 
The use of different communication channels largely depends on audience and 
country, with most manufacturers using two or more channels to communicate with 
health authorities and the general public. Most companies like the idea of having 
an international publication with information and educational material on AEFI, 
although it was cautioned that it should be used only for the most important safety 
concerns that would be relevant for the public, and suggesting that a respected 
organization (e.g. WHO) should be responsible for publishing such a journal. 
The ranking of improvements needed by the companies reveals the four priority areas 
in descending order: active surveillance; passive surveillance; access to global safety 
data, and health database analyses. 
Although there are positive opinions, some companies are pessimistic that passive 
surveillance systems would work in developing countries, indicating that active 
surveillance is the preferred way to monitor adverse events in these countries. 
However, this would require substantial resources to build the necessary infrastructure, 
and this might be unrealistic to achieve. On the other hand, an intensified and 
well-planned enhanced surveillance in selected settings might be a very useful tool in 
developing-country settings to detect signal or collect AEFI data.
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Surprisingly, companies have divergent views on (interventional) clinical studies, 
ranging from most useful to limited value. Observational studies are also seen as useful, 
but highly dependent on regional resources. Immunization registry and health database 
analyses are generally considered valuable, but generally unavailable in developing 
countries, and would need to be linked to each other. In addition, the importance 
is stressed of linking the vaccination report with the associated AEFI to perform a 
meaningful analysis. Access to global safety data is generally seen as helpful, but only if 
the quality of data would be assured, and consolidated information would be reviewed 
by a qualified group, or under the auspices of a reputable institution. 
All vaccine manufacturers agree that education of health-care professionals in developing 
countries is important to improve, for example, the quality of AEFI reporting. 
In general, companies have strong negative opinions about the use of local media 
tracking, thinking that it has no use in pharmacovigilance because it would exaggerate 
individual AEFIs and not give the whole picture. The companies have divided opinions 
on political recognition, with some companies finding it essential to improve vaccination 
programmes, whereas others find it useless. In general, vaccine-safety issues seem to 
be very political in low- and middle-income countries where populist measures may 
be undertaken in the case of safety issues without proper investigation. However, 
it might be difficult to maintain sustainable political recognition of vaccine issues 
(including safety), given that key positions within governments tend to change 
frequently.
2.1.3 Summary Topic 3
Manufacturers’ expectations for a global vaccine safety partnership, including an 
analysis of possible models of collaboration between the public sector and industry
Although most companies report partnerships with governments and NGOs outside 
of national pharmacovigilance programmes, fewer of them report issues within these 
partnerships. Recommendations to address issues are focused on the conditions in 
which the companies would be willing to enter into a partnership, such as the prior 
establishment in writing of clear responsibilities and obligations of the partners, and a 
prior agreement on how to interpret safety data.
Within a partnership, industry would largely provide resources in the areas where their 
strengths lie, for instance, financial support or technical expertise (e.g. in data collection, 
analysis and interpretation). In addition, companies would assume responsibilities in 
the areas of safety monitoring, data collection and analysis, and AEFI-reporting and 
investigation. 
A harmonized AEFI coding dictionary, that could be used for reporting in 
developing countries, is strongly favoured by companies from developing countries. 
Multinational vaccine manufacturers are cautious in this respect, in that AEFI terms 
need to be based on the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA), 
and Brighton Collaboration terms, to be useful. 
In general, data sharing with other companies seems to be a sensitive issue, and is 
restricted to high-level information or to marketing partners. 
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Most companies, but not all, favour a strong degree of cooperation with national 
immunization programmes, the National Regulatory Authority and manufacturers, 
regarding detection, investigation and reporting of AEFIs. A similar picture 
emerged from the questions regarding the degree of cooperation between the 
manufacturer and the public-delivery service of the country using the vaccine. 
Here again, companies show a tendency to favour both strong and medium cooperation. 
However, regarding the investigation of AEFIs, one multinational company wants no 
cooperation at all. 
Companies are also of the opinion that the degree of cooperation between countries 
that produce vaccines, and the countries into which it is exported, should be strong. 
There is universal agreement that there should be a strong degree of common awareness 
between company headquarters and national affiliates regarding detection, investigation 
and reporting of AEFIs. 
Companies favour different options (e.g. web platform, newsletter, or email) regarding 
the sharing of AEFI data between the company and NGOs. 
The companies had many suggestions regarding the minimum capacity requirements 
in the areas of infrastructure, workflow and information flow, reflecting the need for 
establishing a system necessary for adequate AEFI monitoring in developing countries. 
To summarize, there are similar minimum capacity requirements for all three areas 
including: qualified staff; standardized trainings, secure communication infrastructure, 
and the establishment of a passive surveillance system. However, the availability of 
qualified staff seems to have high importance, which implies a major effort, either by 
the manufacturers or WHO, to train them. Manufacturers’ responses to the minimum 
capacity questions illustrated that the area of needs perceived by manufacturers are 
not very different from those of WHO: personnel training; IT and communication; 
surveillance system strengthening, and the establishment of a reliable database in the 
country. The establishment of regional sentinel sites and/or country-level immunization 
centres for monitoring and coordinating of AEFI and pharmacovigilance-related 
activities might be an important step for the improvement of vaccine safety.
There are many diverse suggestions for pharmacovigilance process improvement and 
pharmacovigilance partnership outcome. A further questionnaire, giving the option 
to prioritize the suggestions according to their importance, could indicate where the 
most pressing requirements are. 
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Executive summary
As part of the Global Vaccine Safety Blueprint project, in 2010 a baseline assessment 
of the vaccine safety systems was carried out in 11 countries which are part of the 
WHO Global Network for Post-marketing Surveillance of Prequalified Vaccines. 
The primary objective of this baseline assessment was to contribute to a landscape 
analysis of vaccine safety systems in low- and middle- income countries. The landscape 
analysis, in turn, will be used to define elements of minimal capacity for establishing 
vaccine safety systems in developing countries. 
The baseline assessment was carried out via email using a questionnaire that was 
self-completed by representatives from the 11 network countries, plus telephone 
interviews with those representatives to clarify and validate the data collected. 
Data were collected in six areas: (1) structure and management of AEFI system; 
(2) AEFI surveillance functions [reporting and data management, case investigation 
and analysis]; (3) national immunization safety committee; (4) communication 
with concerned groups; (5) information, education and communication; (6) vaccine 
utilization. 
The key findings of the baseline assessment are presented in this report.
1. Introduction
In 2009 in selected countries, WHO launched the Global Network for Post-marketing 
Surveillance of Prequalified Vaccines (hereinafter referred to as “the PMS Network”), 
to improve post-licensure vaccine safety data and to help deal with challenges relating to 
access to reliable safety data, particularly in the context of investigation and management 
of serious AEFIs. The main objective of the PMS Network is to develop a standardized 
approach for monitoring and assessing serious, rare or unexpected AEFIs with newly 
prequalified vaccines. To achieve this, the PMS Network aims to strengthen the existing 
AEFI surveillance system in member countries. As part of PMS Network activities, 
a country profile (CP) tool was developed, in order to collect basic information 
relevant to AEFI surveillance systems, such as core elements of immunization 
programme capacity and activities for AEFI surveillance, regulatory capacity in general, 
and availability of health indicators relevant to assessment of vaccine safety. 
The primary purpose of the CP tool was to gather baseline information on selected 
variables relevant to the Network in order to facilitate comparisons among the PMS 
Network countries with respect to their vaccine safety data. The baseline CP data 
would also help identify areas that require country-specific technical support in an 
effort to harmonize, where possible, the AEFI surveillance tools and methodologies 
used in the Network countries.
Baseline assessment of the vaccine 
safety systems in the WHO global 
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In February 2010, WHO initiated the Global Vaccine Safety (GVS) Blueprint project, 
which includes a set of studies (Activities 1.1–1.7) to provide a landscape analysis of the 
existing vaccine safety systems in low- and middle-income countries. The landscape 
analysis, in turn, will be used to define elements of minimal capacity for establishing 
vaccine safety systems in developing countries. Within the framework of this initiative, 
a baseline assessment of the vaccine safety systems in the WHO Global PMS Network 
countries (also known as Activity 1.5) was conducted between May and November 
of 2010. This baseline assessment was carried out as an extension of the previous 
country profile assessment. The activity was implemented by a WHO consultant in 
close collaboration with the WHO blueprint project secretariat, and experts from the 
blueprint project collaborative group. The technical oversight committee of the PMS 
Network provided additional inputs in order to ensure a consistency of approach with 
the methods used previously. 
2. Objectives 
The primary objectives of Activity 1.5 were to carry out the baseline assessment of the 
vaccine safety systems among 11 PMS Network countries, and to provide an analysis and 
report to be incorporated in the overall landscape analysis of vaccine safety in low- and 
middle-income countries, for development of the global vaccine safety blueprint. 
Activity 1.5 also had, as secondary objectives, to provide complementary data to 
Activities 1.3 (survey of vaccine regulators), 1.6 (analysis of NRA assessments) and 1.7 
(financial analysis), within the framework of the blueprint project. 
3. Methodology and analysis   
The following 11 PMS Network countries participated in this baseline assessment 
of AEFI surveillance systems: Albania, Brazil, India (Maharashtra State), 
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Mexico, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uganda, 
and Viet Nam. For confidentiality reasons, we substituted the names of the countries 
by numbers from 1 to 11.
The baseline assessment was carried out via email using a standard questionnaire which 
was self-completed by representatives from the 11 PMS Network countries, followed by 
telephone interviews with representatives of those countries for discussion, clarification 
and validation of the data collected.
The questionnaire for the baseline assessment was developed in consultation with the 
WHO Secretariat, the GVS blueprint collaborative group and the technical oversight 
committee of the PMS Network, and was reviewed by WHO regional offices and the 
consultative committee of the GVS blueprint project. 
The questionnaire was built on the previously developed CP tool, in order to provide 
additional information to complement data previously collected during the CP survey 
in PMS Network countries. The main strategy of the current baseline assessment was 
to review, refine and analyse the vaccine safety system components in those countries, 
and to document the infrastructure, systems and tools that could be considered to define 
the notion of minimal capacity to ensure vaccine safety in PMS Network countries. 
Global vaccine safety blueprint - The landscape analysis52
The final (i.e. administered) questionnaire was comprised of groups of questions focused 
on the following: 
AEFI system1) 
structure and management of the AEFI system; –
AEFI surveillance functions 2) 
reporting and data management; –
case investigation and analysis; –
national immunization safety committee 3) 
structure, activities and management of serious AEFIs; –
communication with concerned groups 4) 
information, education and communication; –
finance5) 1
quantification of the human and infrastructural resources for financial  –
analysis;
vaccine utilization.6) 
At least two focal points responsible for AEFI surveillance (from EPI, NRA or the 
National Pharmacovigilance Centre, and a WHO staff member as liaison in one case) 
from each PMS Network country were identified at the beginning of the survey on the 
basis of their active participation in the PMS Network project. All the data collection was 
performed with the collaboration of representatives of the WHO regional offices.
The AEFI focal points were contacted via email and requested to complete the 
questionnaire and validate previously collected information relevant to the AEFI 
surveillance system in their countries. Usually, one of two country representatives 
was contacted subsequently to provide a detailed telephone interview conducted by 
the consultant.
The AEFI focal points from the following institutions participated in the interview: 
EPI staff from 8/11 PMS Network countries; 1) 
NRA staff from 1/11 countries; 2) 
EPI and NRA staff from 1/11 countries.3) 
In 1/11 countries, due to language difficulties, the telephone interview was 4) 
conducted with staff from the WHO Regional Office for the Americas and 
the WHO country office. WHO staff from the regional office and the country 
office had also facilitated completion of the questionnaire.
1  The information collected in section V. Finance was submitted to the financial analysis team 
responsible for Activity 1.7 of the blueprint project for review, analysis and interpretation of the 
financial aspect of AEFI systems in the PMS Network countries.
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The baseline assessment questionnaire included, primarily, multiple-choice questions 
and close-ended questions, while a small number of questions were open-ended 
questions. 
In 10 out of 11 PMS Network countries the multiple-choice questions about different 
activities and functions were focused mainly on three administrative levels; the national, 
sub-national and health-facility levels. The three levels were defined as follows in the 
assessment: 
national level – the Ministry of Health or any institution at the country level;•	
sub-national level – institutions at intermediate level, such as regional or other •	
equivalent, where information is collected from districts and municipalities to 
be submitted to the national level;
health-facility level – the most peripheral level in the health system •	
e.g. immunization centre, district or municipal hospitals, etc.
The data collected from Activity 1.5 were then entered into a Microsoft Excel® file 
for subsequent analysis. The results of the survey are primarily based on descriptive 
analyses. 
4. Summary of the key findings
4.1 Structure and management of AEFI system
All 11 countries have AEFI surveillance systems in place involving three or four 
administrative levels in the AEFI reporting flow. The national EPI is responsible for 
AEFI reporting in all PMS Network countries (Table 1). In 5/11 countries both the 
EPI and NRA are in charge of vaccine safety concerns in the country. In four of them, 
it is a collaborative endeavour between the EPI and NRA, since both organizations 
are actively involved in AEFI surveillance activities (Table 2). 
There are slight differences in collecting AEFI reports from the public and private 
sectors in some countries. Six of 11 countries stated that they receive reports from the 
private sector. In four out of six reported PMS Network countries, both EPI and NRA 
are responsible for the AEFI reporting system. In two of them, EPI is responsible for 
collecting AEFI reports from the public sector and NRA coordinates AEFI reporting 
with the private sector. 
Overall, the EPI and NRA collaborate regularly, although, in some countries, there is a 
limited collaboration between these institutions, due to unclear roles and responsibilities 
in the AEFI surveillance system and also ways of mutual sharing and storing of AEFI 
data. All countries have a National Pharmacovigilance Centre.
The data from the previous country profile survey and this baseline assessment of 
AEFI systems in the PMS Network countries showed the existence of at least two 
designated national focal persons responsible for AEFI surveillance. In all countries, 
one of the two focal points is a representative of the EPI while the second focal point 
is a representative of either the NRA or the National Pharmacovigilance Centre. 
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In all PMS Network countries, the AEFI surveillance system is covered by law or 
other regulations, and usually supported by national AEFI surveillance guidelines. 
The guidelines are distributed among staff involved in AEFI surveillance at all levels 
in 10 countries, and in 1/11 countries, at the national and sub-national levels only. 
Nine PMS Network countries have documented the roles and responsibilities of key 
players involved in AEFI surveillance, and these are usually described in the national 
AEFI surveillance guidelines (Table 1).
A generic flow chart for AEFI reporting is shown in Figure 1 based on flow charts 
provided by the 11 PMS Network countries. The blue boxes with * in this generic flow 
chart are common elements for all PMS Network countries.
In general, the following health professionals are involved in AEFI surveillance. 
Health-care workers (physicians, nurses, other health-care workers) – responsible for 
detection, reporting and management of AEFI in six countries. 
Health supervisors at sub-national level (district and/or regional epidemiologist) 
– responsible for monitoring of AEFI reporting and assistance in AEFI case 
investigation.
In serious AEFI cases, a hospital staff usually notifies the focal point for AEFI 
surveillance at the sub-national level. In some countries, this focal point, 
together with the local investigation team, will finalize the AEFI reporting form and will 
be in charge of AEFI investigation. The information will be simultaneously submitted 
to the EPI and/or NRA or National Pharmacovigilance Centre at the national level. 
In a few countries, the sub-national level is the “relay point” and during a crisis situation 
the staff from health- facility level report directly to the national level which is in charge 
of case investigations. 
National focal point – responsible for coordinating the identification and reporting, 
and investigating the AEFI in their respective states, regions or oblasts, plus assistance 
and communication with media, and reviewing overall pattern of reports and 
investigation.
Usually the national focal point(s) for AEFI surveillance participates in the case 
investigation.
Database team (including person for data entry and data manager) – is responsible for 
maintenance of the national database of AEFI cases.
EPI – systematically monitors the occurrence and investigation of all AEFI cases, 
especially severe or serious cases, and is also in charge of monitoring vaccine distribution 
and administration (records of lot/batch number, if any) and communicates with 
NRA. 
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NRA and/or pharmacovigilance centre – is in charge of regulatory issues. In some 
countries, additional roles of the NRA were reported as post-marketing surveillance, 
and data mining and reporting to the Uppsala Monitoring Centre. These institutions 
also collaborate with the EPI regarding the reported AEFI data in order to identify 
safety signals that merit intervention. In some countries, they are responsible for 
AEFI surveillance and collaboration with the private sector. Four of 11 PMS Network 
countries have active collaborations between two institutions. In 1/11 PMS Network 
countries, the implementation of the AEFI surveillance system involves additional 
institutions such as universities, with links maintained with the NRA and EPI. 
Some representatives of PMS Network countries suggested redefining and clarifying 
the roles of the two parties (EPI and NRA) regarding AEFI surveillance.
Immunization safety committee or expert committee for causality assessment of AEFI 
– are responsible for review of AEFI case investigation and final classification of severe 
and serious AEFI cases. The committee is usually represented by immunologists, 
paediatricians, forensic pathologists, infectious disease and neurology specialists, 
and epidemiologists, and members from EPI and NRA. 
Private sector – the data provided indicated that the private sector is not 
involved in AEFI surveillance system activities in five PMS Network countries. 
Accordingly, AEFI notifications are received from the private sector only in the 
remaining six PMS Network countries. 
4.2 AEFI surveillance functions
4.2.1 AEFI reporting tools
All PMS Network countries have national AEFI reporting forms. In 1/11 PMS Network 
countries the same standardized form is used for reporting to both the EPI and NRA; 
this can be considered as a best practice by other countries (including PMS Network 
countries, where applicable). 
There is a substantial variation in the list of reportable AEFIs in the countries surveyed. 
All 11 countries have guidelines specifying reportable adverse events. Six out of 
11 countries specify reportable events that are consistent with the WHO generic 
guidelines “Immunization safety surveillance: guidelines for managers of immunization 
programmes on reporting and investigating AEFIs” [WPRO/EPI/99.01]. According to 
the content of the list of reportable AEFIs, the PMS Network countries can be divided 
into four groups. 
First group of countries, whose list of reportable AEFIs is described as list of 1) 
local and rare vaccine reactions, e.g. anaphylactoid, anaphylaxis, hypotonic-
hyporesponsive episode (HHE), toxic shock syndrome (TSS), severe local 
reaction, sepsis, etc.
Second group of countries, which has more general recommendations to report, 2) 
like any death, hospitalizations, clusters, suspected vaccines, or other severe and 
unusual events that are thought by health workers or the community to be related 
to immunization, and a list of vaccine reactions.
Third group of countries, which has a list of reportable AEFIs with all the 3) 
recommendations mentioned above. 
In the last group of countries, the information is either not available or not 4) 
clear.
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Ten PMS Network countries distribute the list of reportable AEFI at all levels. 
In 1/11 PMS Network countries, the list of reportable AEFI is not available among 
staff at the health-facility level, but is distributed among AEFI focal points.
Similarly, only 5/11 countries use AEFI case definitions recommended by WHO, 
and in only 1/11 countries the NRA reported use of the Brighton Collaboration case 
definitions for reporting. The rest of the countries stated different sources of AEFI 
case definitions used. In 8/11 PMS Network countries the current case definitions are 
circulated at all levels, while the remaining 3/11 countries reported that the definitions 
are only distributed at the national level.
Although nine PMS Network countries declared availability of written procedures 
for actions to be taken (e.g. reporting and case management), in the case of serious 
AEFIs or clusters (Figure 2), only one country provided such documents for review 
and validation. 
 The officially recommended timeframe for reporting of serious AEFI in 10 countries 
is 24–48 hours, with the exception of one which does not have a specific timeframe 
(Figure 3). All PMS Network countries stated that “usually” all serious adverse events 
and death cases are reported immediately, or within 24–48 hours after occurrence, 
by all means of communication. 
The timeframe of reporting for non-serious AEFI cases is specified in the majority of 
PMS Network countries, and non-serious AEFIs are usually reported on a monthly or 
weekly basis (Figure 4). Reporting in nine countries is mandatory for serious AEFIs at 
all levels, and in five countries for non-serious AEFIs, also at all levels (Figures 5, 6). 
However, the reporting of AEFI is voluntary in two PMS Network countries. 
Even in those countries with mandatory reporting, underreporting of AEFI cases 
is observed. Fear of punishment and a limited appreciation by health-care workers 
of the significance of AEFI reporting, were noted as some possible explanations of 
underreporting.
All 11 PMS Network countries are using case-based data reporting tools at the 
health-facility level (Figure 7). In addition to case-based data, eight countries use a 
line-listing format to report AEFI data and seven countries use aggregated data. 
The data provided indicates that the private sector is not involved in AEFI surveillance 
system activities in five PMS Network countries. Only in six countries are AEFI 
notifications collected from the private sector. 
4.2.2 Data management
In 10 PMS Network countries, the AEFI data coding/entry is performed at the national 
level. In three countries, the data coding/entry is performed at both the national and 
sub-national levels. There is at least one database manager at the national level in nine 
PMS Network countries. 
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4.2.3 Case investigation and analysis
In this section, it is important to note that the baseline assessment questionnaire did 
not define or specify the level of AEFI case investigation. 
Written procedures for case investigation are available at the national level in eight PMS 
Network countries and at all levels in six of them (Figure 8). Case-investigation forms 
are available in all PMS Network countries.
In almost all PMS Network countries (9/11) there is at least one person responsible 
for monitoring of AEFI data reported and investigated. It is usually a national focal 
point from the EPI/AEFI system. Nevertheless, there is no monitoring specifically for 
AEFI detection and reporting. Monitoring of AEFI reporting is included in the overall 
monitoring of the immunization programme at the regional (sub-national) level.
In nine countries, the annual number of AEFI cases investigated varied from 
one to 1545 in 2009 (Figure 9). The data was not available from two countries. 
The average number of AEFI cases investigated is 252, with standard deviation SD=492 
(range 1 to 1545). To make these data comparable, we calculated the number of AEFI 
cases	investigated	per	100	000	population	of	children	<5	years,	because	this	age	group	
receives the majority of vaccines from the EPI programme (Table 3). Based on this, 
one group (3/9) of PMS Network countries had the lowest numbers of AEFI cases 
investigated	per	100	000	population	<5	years	in	2009	(0.02,	0.14,	0.96,	respectively).	 
The second group (3/9) of PMS Network countries had similar numbers of cases 
investigated	per	100	000	population	<5	years	(1.37,	1.39	and	1.48	cases,	respectively)	
and the third group (3/9) had increasingly higher numbers of cases investigated per 
100	000	population	<5	years	 (5.48,	 12.66	 and	86.61,	 respectively)	during	 the	 same	
year.
Among eight countries which reported annual data from 2007 to 2009, the median 
proportion of AEFI case investigations that started within 48 hours following reporting 
was 50%, 51% and 75%, respectively (Figure 10, Table 4).
Among seven countries which reported annual data from 2007 to 2009, the median 
proportion of preliminary investigation reports available within one week from the 
start of investigation was 5%, 25% and 50%, respectively (Figure 11, Table 5). 
Six countries reported that the majority of final investigation reports (ranging from 
50% to 100%) are submitted less than six weeks after the investigation onset. 
Among seven countries, the median proportion of AEFI investigation conclusions 
supported by laboratory findings on clinical specimens, or laboratory findings for 
vaccine samples, is 10% each, while 62.5% of fatal AEFI cases were supported by 
post-mortem findings (Table 6). 
There is a trend observed in frequency of feedback from the national level to AEFI staff, 
immunization staff, AEFI reporters and other health-care providers, which is higher 
compared to parents/vaccinees/community and media groups. In general, countries do 
not share information with parents and the media. 
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Monthly or quarterly summary reports of AEFI cases are produced in 10 countries. 
The information was not available from 1/11 PMS Network country. The annual 
summary reports are produced in eight countries.
4.3 National immunization safety committee
Ten countries have a national immunization safety committee with responsibilities 
related either to AEFI case investigation, or to AEFI causality assessment, or to both 
functions (Figure 12). Usually the committee members are appointed by the Ministry 
of Health. Four countries have written procedures and criteria for the selection of the 
members of the national immunization safety committee. Only two countries have 
written documents with defined roles and responsibilities of the national immunization 
safety committee. 
The frequency with which these immunization safety committees meet ranges from 
one meeting per month to one meeting every three months; this is confirmed by the 
existence of the meeting reports among six PMS Network countries. 
Eight countries use the WHO classification of AEFI type (vaccine reaction, 
programme error, etc.). Two countries have country-specific classification of AEFI. 
Ten PMS Network countries use the WHO categories for causal association with 
vaccines. 
In the majority of PMS Network countries, a routine system is established for review, 
validation and final categorization by the national immunization safety committee, or by 
the national AEFI focal points. Three countries reported that a causality categorization 
is performed by their national immunization safety committee and by the national AEFI 
focal point(s). Usually, national AEFI focal points are also members of the national 
immunization safety committee. 
4.4 Training 
During the telephone interviews we tried to clarify whether updated information, 
including training materials, are regularly provided at all levels of the AEFI surveillance 
system. In general, only official documents, decisions and orders relevant to vaccine 
safety, and issued by MOH, are distributed at almost all levels. 
The survey indicated that the median proportion of staff involved in AEFI 
surveillance that participated in AEFI or related training since January 2006 was >75% 
(range 0%–100%) at the national level, 63% (range 0%–80%) at the sub-national 
level and 10% (range 0%–75%) at the health-facility level. Generally, the median 
proportion of staff trained was correlated with the administrative level in descending 
order. Consequently, a greater proportion of staff participated from the national level 
compared to sub-national and health-facility levels, and there was no training reported 
at health-facility levels. However, this can be biased due to several reasons. First of 
all, some national focal points were not aware about training conducted at peripheral 
levels. Secondly, the denominator at sub-national and health-facility level might be 
greater compared to fewer number of staff working at the national level. As an example, 
one of the countries reported 100 % of participants from the national level, which was 
one AEFI focal point at the MOH. 
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The survey found that the number of trainees who attended AEFI workshops in 
different countries during a period of three years varied from 15 to 25 000 training 
participants. We excluded the number of participants at community level (10 000 and 
25 000 trainees in two countries) to eliminate skewing of the result. Thus, the average 
number of trainees in PMS Network countries for the three-year period (2006–2008) 
was 92 trainees. 
Overall, the main groups of participants targeted for training in AEFI workshops were 
health managers and vaccinators, immunization specialists and epidemiologists, nurses 
and midwifes, EPI and focal points from different levels, and NRA representatives 
responsible for post-marketing surveillance at the national and state levels. 
Workshops for health professionals involved in AEFI surveillance were mostly 
organized at the national and sub-national levels. 
The median proportion of staff from the private sector that participated in training 
activities since 2006 was 5% (range 0%–60%) among 11 countries. Only one country 
reported that since 2006 training has involved staff from the private sector; an estimated 
60% of trainees. Of the remaining countries, in three PMS Network countries, 
estimates were that 5% to 10% of staff from the private sector have received training 
relevant to vaccine safety. Overall, the majority of countries either could not answer 
this question, or reported that staff from the private sector had not participated in such 
training sessions. 
The information collected is insufficient to describe which type of training has been 
provided relevant to AEFI. The majority of countries provided general information 
on training for immunization/AEFI staff, except 4/11 countries, who provided lists 
describing the training sessions relevant to vaccine safety issues conducted in their 
countries such as: training for causality assessment provided by WHO; workshops on 
AEFIs for the focal points and immunization centres; AEFI update at immunization 
coordinators’ meetings; training for national regulatory authority staff on vaccine 
prequalification and AEFI surveillance (pharmacovigilance of vaccines); seminars 
at the national level to introduce the national AEFI guidelines, and post-marketing 
surveillance seminars with training on AEFI monitoring integrated into safe-vaccination 
workshops. 
4.5 Communication with concerned groups
Information, education and communication (IEC)
Four countries have some kind of documentation to provide guidance on 
the establishment of a communication system relevant to vaccine safety. However, 
none of the PMS Network countries have prepared documents specific for vaccine 
safety that can be used as guidance for the establishment of communication systems 
relevant to AEFI. 
Six countries have a communication unit at the national level, which are, in general, 
responsible for risk communications for the whole public-health system, including 
vaccine safety concerns. 
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Seven countries have, at the MOH, a designated spokesperson for media enquiries, 
who is usually responsible for all public-health issues, including vaccine safety matters. 
In two PMS Network countries, in case of serious AEFI, one of the committee members 
or another MOH official may communicate with the media.
None of the 11 PMS Network countries have a communication plan for vaccine safety. 
However, some information on vaccine safety crisis is included in the national guidelines 
of a couple of countries.
There is a system among seven countries for providing feedback on AEFI from the 
national level, mainly to the health-care providers and occasionally to the media. 
No process for providing feedback to the community was documented or demonstrated 
by any of the countries. 
In six countries, either EPI or NRA regularly checks the local media for reports of 
AEFI. 
Different countries responded differently on the existence of information materials 
for the community and for parents and vaccinees. Eight countries have information 
materials relevant to vaccination for the community, and for parents and vaccinees. 
Limited information is provided on vaccine safety issues to parents and community 
members. Five countries do not have information materials on vaccine safety for both 
concerned groups.
Seven PMS Network countries do not share information on vaccine safety and AEFI 
with the private sector. Only in countries where the NRA collaborates regularly with 
the private sector is information relevant to vaccine safety provided to representatives 
of the private sector. 
Six PMS Network countries have conducted IEC sessions on immunization for mothers 
during the last three years. Usually, in those countries which do not conduct the IEC 
sessions for parents, the health-care workers provide parents with explanations about 
vaccines and possible vaccine reactions, prior to immunization sessions. 
4.6 Vaccine utilization
Information on the total number of doses distributed is recorded at the national level 
in 10 countries. 
The information on lot/batch number of doses distributed is recorded at the national 
level in nine countries. There is a tendency to record lot number of doses distributed 
at higher supervisory levels compared with health-facility level. Consequently, 
trends observed in this survey suggest that the probability of finding information 
on lot/batch number of doses distributed is higher at the national level compared to 
sub-national and health-facility levels. This is logical, as vaccines are distributed from 
the national to lower supervisory levels, and therefore the information on distribution 
of vaccines is likely to be recorded at higher supervisory levels. However, it is important 
to record lot/batch numbers at health-facility levels as well, so as to permit easy 
identification of lot/batches during AEFI investigations and follow up of cases. 
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The information on total number of doses administered is recorded and available at 
all levels in 10 countries. This is a good indication in case of tracing information on 
vaccines associated with AEFI cases and is also used for denominator data to allow for 
reliable estimation of coverage.
The information on lot/batch number of doses administered is recorded less often 
compared with number of doses distributed and administered, hence, this information 
is submitted to the national and sub-national levels in only five countries. 
The data collected for vaccine utilization was consistent with information collected 
previously during the CP survey.
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Table 2: Responsible institutions for AEFI reporting
EPI EPI and NRA Total
6 5 11
1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11 2*, 4, 6, 7, 9** 
* In country two - public sector reports to EPI, and private sector to NRA;
** In country nine - national centre of pharmacovigilance, NRA is responsible for private sector,  
while both EPI and NRA have joint responsibility for public sector.
Figure 1: Generic AEFI reporting flow chart is based on flow charts  
provided by 11 PMS Network countries. The blue boxes with * are common 
elements for all PMS Network countries 
National immunization safety committee*
Communication unit Designated spokesperson
EPI* Database team*
NRA/PhV*
Centre
 National focal points (2)*
Health supervisors
(district and/or regional epidemiologist)*
Medical staff *
Govt/private hospitals
  Immunization 
clinic* Community*
  Suspected case of AEFI
Fe
ed
ba
ck
National level
Sub-national level
Health-facility level
MOH
* Available in all PMS Network countries
Appendix II: 
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Figure 2: Existence of written procedures (SOPs) for AEFI reporting  
and case management
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Figure 3: Specified time frame for reporting serious AEFIs
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Figure 4: Usual timelines for reporting non-serious AEFIs
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Figure 5: Mandatory to report serious AEFIs
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Figure 6: Mandatory to report non-serious AEFIs
0
Sub-national level Health-facility level
1
2
3
4
5
N
o 
of
 c
ou
nt
rie
s
National level
6
7 6 6
7
Figure 7: Type of tool used for AEFI reporting
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Figure 8:  SOPs for AEFI case investigation
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Figure 9:  Number of AEFI cases investigated in 2009 
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Table 3: Number of AEFI cases investigated per 100 000 population  
of children under 5 years of age in 2009
Countries* Number of AEFI cases investigated in 2009
Population of children  
<5 years of age
Number of AEFI cases 
investigated per 100 000 
population of children  
<5 years of age
1 3 219 489 1.37
2 150 15 654 687 0.96
3 129 8 697 079 1.48
4 830 6 554 616 12.66
5 79 1 440 969 5.48
6 NA NA NA
7 29 2 093 807 1.39
8 1545 1 783 778 86.61
9 NA NA NA
10 1 6 368 078 0.02
11 10 7 238 286 0.14
Mean 252
* The names of 11 PMS Network countries are substituted by numbers from 1 to 11. 
Figure 10: Proportion of AEFI case investigations started within 48 hours 
following reporting in last three years
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Table 4: Median proportion of AEFI case investigations started within 48 hours 
following reporting in last three years
Network countries* 2007 2008 2009
1 0% 0% 0%
2 60% 90% 90%
3 18% 100% 90%
4 53% 51% 72%
5 90% 90% 100%
6 0% 0% 0%
7 0% 0% 0%
8 0.1% 1.0% 4.20%
9 50% 50% 75%
10 100% 100% 100%
11 100% 100% 100%
Median 50% 51% 75%
* The names of 11 PMS Network countries are substituted by numbers from 1 to 11. 
Figure 11: Proportion of preliminary investigation reports available within one 
week from the start of investigation for 2007–2009
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Table 5: Median proportion of preliminary investigation reports available within 
one week from the start of investigation during 2007–2009
Network countries* 2007 2008 2009
1 0% 0% 0%
2 5% 10% 10%
3 2% 48% 84%
4 65% 66% 79%
5 90% 90% 100%
6 0% 0% 0%
7 0% 0% 0%
8 0% 0% 0%
9 25% 25% 50%
10 100% 100% 100%
11 90% 90% 90%
Median 5% 25% 50%
* The names of 11 PMS Network countries are substituted by numbers from 1 to 11.
Table 6: Median proportion of AEFI investigation conclusions supported by 
laboratory findings
Network 
countries*
Laboratory findings 
(positive or negative)  
on clinical specimen(s)
Post-mortem findings  
(among AEFI deaths)
Laboratory findings 
(positive or negative) 
 for vaccine samples
1 No experience with such cases
2 >=75% 10% to <25% <10%
3 25%–50% >75% 10%–25%
4 NA NA NA
5 10% 10% 10%
6 NA NA NA
7 NA NA NA
8 <10% >75% <10%
9 NA 100% for death NA
10 <10% 0% <10%
11 Very limited <50% Do not send
Median 10% 62.5% 10%
* The names of 11 PMS Network countries are substituted by numbers from 1 to 11.
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Figure 12: National immunization safety committee(s)
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1. Background and context
Between September 2009 and December 2010 (15 months) an analysis of the data 
gathered from all national regulatory authority assessments that were conducted in 
101 countries were analysed, with a focus on post-marketing surveillance, including the 
adverse events following immunization (PMS/AEFI) surveillance function. These data 
were analysed in two phases. The first phase data were presented during the July 2010 
retreat of the WHO global safety blueprint in London. The second phase of analysis 
that was planned, taking into consideration the comments provided during the retreat, 
was completed in early January 2011. 
Figure 1: Strengthening national regulatory authorities —  
101 countries assessed and/or followed up as of 2009
NRA assessment information available
Not NRA assessment information
Analysis of NRA assessment data 
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The main findings provide information on the following aspects: existence of a system; 
its level of implementation; its documentation to be implemented consistently to WHO 
recommendations, to plan, run and monitor the PMS/AEFI surveillance programme; 
the coordination and exchange of information between the key stakeholders and 
institutions; the data management and monitoring; the vaccine performance framework; 
the feedback to relevant institutions, inside or outside the country; training of health 
staff and professionals; the capacity to detect and investigate in a timely manner, 
monitor completeness and analyse the information and detect signal, including causality 
management, and regulatory oversight of manufacturers for PMS. 
The analysis reviewed the global picture, according to WHO regions, and group of 
countries according to level of income, health expenditures, diphtheria-pertussis-
tetanus (DPT3) immunization coverage and UN Human Development Index (HDI). 
All eight PMS/AEFI indicators were compared against these indicators. The analysis 
focused mainly on the indicators and not on all the sub-indicators, as only selected 
sub-indicators was drawn to be analysed during the review. 
The analysis was lead by WHO quality safety standards teams of the Department 
of Immunization, Vaccines and Biologicals, and several experts and data managers 
(including one IT staff) were also involved. Country experts that were invited to 
contribute to the review process through drafting, analysis or comments were 
recruited from the following countries: Senegal (AFR), Brazil (AMR/PAHO), India, 
Sri Lanka (SEAR), the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tunisia (EMR). In addition, 
WHO staff involved in PMS/AEFI activities, from WHO Headquarters, WHO South-
East Asia Region, WHO European Region and WHO Western Pacific Region, were 
also invited to provide comments.
The main findings can be divided into: (a) global analysis; (b) regional analysis; 
(c) economic, access and composite indicators. Since 1996, WHO has collected data 
through 315 country visits and 101 WHO assessments of the vaccine regulatory systems 
that were conducted in all regions of the world (Figure 1). So far, WHO has been 
able to document the situation against a set of indicators in all the regulatory systems 
assessed (101). These data concern all various regulatory functions ranging from: 
system components; marketing authorization and licensing activities; post-marketing 
surveillance (PMS) of AEFI; NRA lot release; laboratory access, and regulatory 
inspections and oversight of clinical trials. For each of these functions, WHO is routinely 
analysing the information and providing, through a dedicated website, the outcome 
of these analyses for planning purposes. Some funding was already provided from the 
GAVI Alliance to focus on GAVI countries that were supported from their grant, and 
to develop specific databases. This report focuses on the indicators and sub-indicators 
relevant to the PMS/AEFI.
The WHO NRA assessment tool consists of a composite scale to transfer sub-indicators 
and indicators to a measurable term; hence it allows a comparison of performance by 
each function over a time period to illustrate the progress of the NRA system. 
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Description and assumptions are: 
a description of the status of the PMS/AEFI regulatory functions in all countries •	
assessed by WHO (functional, not functional, low/medium/high maturity 
level);
a description of the eight indicators and their status for each country assessed •	
from 1996 to 2008, as described in Table 1.
Table 1: Indicators for the post-marketing surveillance (PMS) of adverse events 
following immunization (AEFI)
Indicator 
number
Aspect evaluated
PM1
Institutional regulations and guidelines for post-marketing surveillance, including monitoring and 
management of AEFI
PM2 Quality management system for post-marketing activities
PM3
Roles and responsibilities of the key players (immunization staff, NRA, NCL, surveillance staff, 
etc.)
PM4 Human resource management
PM5
Routine and functional system for regular review of safety and efficacy of the vaccine product for 
regulatory action, including a process to review and share relevant data between key players, and 
taking appropriate action
PM6 Capacity to detect and investigate significant vaccine safety issues
PM7 Regulatory outcome regarding vaccine performance
PM8 System for providing feedback on AEFI from the national level to all levels
2. Results
2.1 Global analysis
The PMS/AEFI 1997–2009 NRA function implementation status (Figure 2) illustrates 
progress in documenting country performance over time, with 35 countries (18%) 
having implemented the function in 1997, to 77 (35%) in 2009. At the time of the analysis, 
following 356 country visits, 35% of the countries of the world have implemented 
NRA function. For the remaining 65%, 32% were not implemented and 33% are 
unknown. In general, almost all indicators show slow and gradual, but positive progress, 
on combined partial/full implementation of indicators and sub-indicators. Figure 2 
below shows progress at the level of all eight indicators.
Global vaccine safety blueprint - The landscape analysis78
Figure 2: Status of PMS/AEFI function 1997–2009
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2.2 World Bank economic status
The comparison was based on the income allowed to differentiate two major groups: 
(1) industrialized countries which were all assessed against WHO NRA indicators 
and for which the percentage of countries that met the indicators ranged between 
90% to 100%; (2) all middle- and low-income countries for which the percentage 
of implementation of those with data available ranges between 23% to 54%. 
Currently, if we exclude industrialized countries, only 30% middle-, low middle- and 
low-income countries were assessed against indicators. This is explained because the 
WHO priorities to conduct assessment were mainly targeting (a) vaccine producing, 
and (b) procuring countries, that are ranged in the group of industrialized and 
middle-income countries.
Industrialized countries have higher scores in implementing all indicators. The analysis 
also shows that a range of 43 to 48, out of 48 industrialized countries, have implemented 
all the indicators of the post-marketing activities, including surveillance of AEFI 
function. They are closely followed by upper middle-income and lower middle-income 
countries which have similar results, and then by the group of low-income countries. 
Figure 3 illustrates data available on PM06 that documents the capacity to detect and 
investigate significant vaccine safety issues. If we consider the level of implementation 
between the middle income and the low- income countries, it is usually about 2-fold 
higher, except for the last indicator (PM8 – system for providing feedback on AEFI 
from the national to all levels), for which the ratio is closer to one that indicates that 
country economic status makes a major difference in implementing the PMS/AEFI 
function and relevant indicators.
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Figure 3: Indicator PM6 according to World Bank economic status
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2.3 WHO regions
The performance of implementation by WHO regions indicates that the WHO African 
Region, Region of the Americas and Western Pacific Region, have a low implementation 
of the AEFI/PMS indicators, with a percentage generally under 10% out of the total 
countries in each region. This percentage is, in part, explained by the low number of 
countries from these regions that were assessed (27%, 17% and 14%, respectively). 
On the other hand, in the South-East Asia Region, 82% of countries have data available. 
In the South-East Asia Region, the percentage of implementation for these countries 
ranges between 22% (PM6) to 56% (PM3, PM4 and PM5). Countries from the 
Eastern Mediterranean Region have implementations ranging between 13% and 
33%, and for the European Region, 8% to 38%. In the European Region, countries 
that had low implementation are mostly all former computerized EPI information 
system/national immunization survey (CEIS/NIS) countries that faced serious 
organizational and resources issues. The group of countries in the European Region 
that have implemented the function are the old and new European Union countries 
(27 countries); however, within this group, some countries are not meeting high levels of 
performance, since they had joined the European Union recently, and are still developing 
their PMS/AEFI programmes. Figure 4 illustrates data available for PM6.
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Figure 4: Indicator PM6 by WHO region (excluding industrialized countries)
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2.4 DPT3 immunization coverage 
Figure 5: Indicator PM6 by DTP3 coverage (excluding industrialized countries)
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Countries with a DTP3 coverage ranging between 86% and 90% had implemented 
the indicators with the highest percentages; up to 100% if we consider only those with 
data available (and up to 30% if it is calculated using the total number of countries). 
This group is followed by the one with a DTP3 coverage >90%, which is the largest group 
(79 countries), including up to 17 countries which have implemented the indicators, 
out of 31 with data available, and out of 79 of the total number of countries. 
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The implementation of the indicators according to coverage reflects the correlation 
between the performance of immunization services and the health system in general. 
New assessments would refine the results and allow a more accurate analysis. 
In addition, it would be interesting to reassess those countries with a DTP3 
coverage >90% to identify issues, and to assist them in implementing the indicators. 
Figure 5 illustrates data available for PM6.
2.5 Health expenditure
The largest group of countries (81) is represented by those for which health expenditure 
is ranged between US$ 25 and US$ 75 per person per year. The group of countries with 
the highest health expenditure (US$ >75 per person per year) performs definitively 
well and reaches high percentages. In general, the group of countries for which the 
health	 expenditure	 is	US$	<25	 achieved	better	percentages	 than	 the	 second	group	
(health expenditure between US$ 25 and US$ 75). This suggests that post-marketing 
activities, including surveillance of AEFI function, does not require high investment 
to have an impact on programmes and on the relevant health-system component, 
but it seems to be more dependent on the effectiveness of the programme’s management 
of activities.
Figure 6: Indicator PM6 by health expenditures  
(excluding industrialized countries)
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2.6 UN human development indicators (HDI)
The HDI measure is a composite indicator that measures governance, social-, 
health-, education- and economic-development in terms of life expectancy, 
educational attainment and adjusted real income. This index has not been calculated 
for 22 countries that were included in the sample for 2010, because of missing 
information. 
The implementation of the indicators seems to match the rank assigned for the HDI. 
Countries with a very high HDI confirm they have achieved higher performance, 
close to 100%, of those with data available, and all these countries already represent 
50% of the total countries assessed in each region. This group is followed by both 
groups of countries with a high HDI and a middle HDI, for which 18% to 29% 
of the total countries in each region have implemented the indicators PM1 to PM5. 
The indicators PM6 to PM8 have been implemented by a lower percentage of countries 
among these regions; 11% to 13% out of the total countries in the region. Only a few 
countries (1–4) from those with a low HDI have implemented the indicators.
3. General conclusions
The results of this study show that most industrialized countries (90% to 100%) 
have implemented the PMS/AEFI indicators. However, there is a need to strengthen 
the regulatory PMS/AEFI function in most middle- and low-income countries and, 
more specifically, in the countries that are in the following subgroup.
a)	 Health	expenditure	US$	<75	per	person	per	year.
b)	 DTP3	coverage	<86%.	
When looking at the HDI and the level of performance of each PMS/AEFI indicator, 
we can see a correlation between the level of HDI and the level of performance of the 
indicators. This also suggests that it will be interesting to investigate further to see 
which composite indicators of the HDI might influence the highest development of 
PMS/AEFI performance and its sustainability. 
When observing the percentages of implementation of the indicators between different 
groups, we found similar profiles between both indicators PM2 and PM3 and, in some 
cases, between PM1 and PM2. Indeed, the establishment of the quality management 
system (PM2) requires both the existence of written guidelines (which is part of 
PM1) and the definition of responsibilities (which is also requested with the indicator 
PM3). 
Data also confirm that PMS/AEFI is linked to the economic status; wealthy countries 
can do more than poorer ones in developing their PMS/AEFI system. However, 
for activities relevant to indicators PM1, PM4 and PM5, a greater proportion of 
lower middle- income countries than those with an upper middle income had met the 
indicators; one reason being that there are national plans to develop, build capacity 
and monitor the activities and, in several cases, these plans had contributed to mobilize 
national and external resources for the programme, and increase political commitment 
and support. 
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The relationship between health expenditure and the implementation of the indicators 
seems to be less obvious. This suggests that the implementation of the function does 
not require too much investment, although WHO estimates of minimum spending 
per person per year needed to provide basic, life-saving services, is ranged between 
US$ 35 to US$ 50. It is also noted that, when launching a PMS/AEFI programme, 
few activities need to be implemented that are focusing on setting a national framework 
to build capacity (national guidelines, assigning a focal point and institution, etc.), 
than when activities needed to further expand more funding is definitively required, 
as more institutions and staff are involved in the system. Funds should be used more 
efficiently by countries (especially by the group of countries where health expenditure 
is between US$ 25 to 75 US$ per person per year), and assistance could be provided 
by WHO to help them to achieve this objective with a minimum level of external 
resources. 
These preliminary results give a global vision of the status of the PMS/AEFI surveillance 
activities and recommend the definition of new priorities, as well as investment in 
better planning (institutional development plan to guide countries to coordinate and 
optimize use of existing resources) when combining the parameters which were used 
to realize this study. For instance, low-income countries from the WHO African 
Region, with health expenditure between US$ 25 to US$ 75 per person per year, and a 
DTP3-coverage between 71% and 80%, may point a way to optimize the current 
programme and guide priority for investment. 
4. Recommendations for country capacity and further analysis 
Data from this analysis also points to framing requirements for minimal capacity 
for vaccine safety at country level. Concepts and principles to guide countries to 
establish, develop and sustain a vaccine safety programme, can be derived to help the 
vaccine safety blueprint project further develop the concept and its implementation. 
The analysis shows that:
Legal frameworks that enable the development and implementation of the •	
recommended functions exist in all industrialized and middle-income countries. 
However, they do not exist at all, or are limited, in low-income countries. 
Further support for the establishment of a minimum legal framework would 
therefore be an important component to support national governance and 
build the minimal capacity to further develop a vaccine safety programme in all 
low-income countries.
Detection of signal through active reporting does not exist in most of the •	
countries; however, it exists as spontaneous reporting in most countries but 
is not often used optimally to detect signals and take appropriate actions, 
whatever the level of income. The project should refine or propose acceptable 
definitions to be able to further analyse the information available, and to clarify 
what would be desirable in terms of active surveillance capacity.
Current scientific investigation mechanisms, that may exist at country level, •	
with resources available or with external support, is documented through the 
survey as established in all industrialized countries without external support, 
and in most middle-income countries with occasional external support. 
The analysis also indicates that the samples of middle income- and low-income 
countries that were assessed was limited to 30% of the total. The limited amount 
of data currently available may limit the extrapolation of the analysis to all 
countries of this group. Further assessment may be recommended to confirm 
the preliminary findings in these countries.
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Capacity to initiate timely corrective actions when concerns and established •	
risks are investigated and documented, is in place in all industrialized countries, 
and some high income- and middle-income countries. For these countries, 
the system performs with some differences in some middle-income countries 
that may not have all the necessary expertise, particularly in the introduction of 
new products. Overall, there are coordination mechanisms between stakeholders 
and a monitoring of the safety concerns where the regulatory system for vaccine 
safety is established and functioning. In all these countries, a documented system 
exists that aims to meet the guiding principle of a quality management system.
In the area of communication of concerns and establishing risks locally with •	
international partners (assessed through vaccine performance and feedback 
indicators), networks that share information to the public, through websites 
and other communication channels, are available in industrialized countries and 
some middle-income countries. In the low middle- and low-income countries, 
communication systems are limited, usually with no communication strategy 
for the public, media and other relevant international or interested partners or 
agencies. This reflects the limited infrastructure, staffing and financial resources, 
and lack of a system-development plan in these countries.
All countries assessed operate through a direct supervision of the Ministry •	
of Health, and most institutions, if not all, are under national-health service 
coordination mechanisms, often represented by the Ministry of Health. 
There is almost no private-sector involvement in this process, except when vaccine 
manufacturers have their own PMS systems.
Access to expertise was also documented through defined responsibilities •	
of relevant stakeholders and access to expertise in the area of vaccine safety. 
The indicators show higher performance in all industrialized countries and in 
middle-income countries. However, it remains limited in the area of new vaccines. 
Many regulatory agencies have a limited interest in vaccines, focusing primarily 
on pharmaceuticals. A greater emphasis on vaccine production, vaccine safety 
and quality, and vaccine development is therefore required, in order to better 
understand issues around the introduction of new vaccines that will often be 
complex products.
The existence of a regulatory framework was documented through indicator •	
PM1 and PM2. Data indicate a strong legal framework with specialized and 
documented process in all industrialized countries, the majority of middle-income 
countries and quite a significant number of low-income countries. However, in 
this group, the regulatory framework is usually less developed and primarily 
provides a mandate to the programme.
Most industrialized countries have a strategic planning process that covers •	
several years, between two to five years and, in some cases, more than 10 years. 
All countries have a one to five-year workplan that includes performance 
indicators to monitor progress. A major difference between industrialized 
countries and low-income countries is the level of monitoring and  
supervision of the implementation, which is weaker in low-income countries. 
Industrialized countries often have a strong qualified management system that 
may be resource-intensive and costly. Moreover, performance indicators are not 
used to drive strategic planning after the plans have been developed.
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Executive summary
The goal of the study was to provide data on the cost and funding for; (a) current vaccine 
safety systems in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), and (b) international 
vaccine safety initiatives. These data were collected to inform decisions on budgets 
and funding choices for WHO’s strategic plan for enhancing global vaccine safety 
activities. The study targeted 11 national vaccine safety systems (NVSSs)1 as well as 
13 international vaccine safety initiatives (IVSIs)1 for the year 2009.  
However, due to data availability, data analysis is only provided for five countries out 
of the eleven (Brazil, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, Senegal and Uganda).
National vaccine safety systems costs and funding (Brazil, Iran, Mexico,  
Senegal and Uganda)
Results showed that the average cost of vaccine safety system per vaccine doses 
administered was US$ 0.03 on average per country (from US$ 0.0014 in Uganda to 
US$ 0.0648 in Mexico). 
The cost per fully immunized child was US$ 0.53 on average per country 
(from US$ 0.01 in Uganda to US$ 1.37 in Iran). Countries identified as having 
well-established AEFI surveillance systems (Brazil, Iran and Mexico) had the highest 
total costs in comparison to other systems (Senegal and Uganda). Middle-income 
economies had a relatively higher cost of their NVSSs. Personnel were by far the largest 
contributor, at 81% of the NVSS total costs (from 50% in Uganda to 97% in Iran). 
Shared personnel were the main cost driver, accounting for 68% of total costs on average 
(from 38% in Brazil to 94% in Iran). Specific personnel represented 13% of total costs 
on average per country (from 0% in Uganda and Senegal to 54% in Brazil). 
Financial assessment
1 Albania, Brazil, India [Maharashtra state], the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, 
Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uganda, and Viet Nam.
2 WHO Global Network for Post-Surveillance of Newly Prequalified Vaccines; national regulatory 
authority assessment (WHO); CIOMS/WHO working group on vaccine pharmacovigilance; 
case definitions and guidelines for adverse events, Brighton Collaboration (BC); automatic 
case verification (BC); Global Vaccine Safety Data Link (GVSD); background rate of concern 
verification (BC); Global Vaccine Safety Data Link (GVSD) – hypothesis testing studies (BC); 
vaccine safety crisis management / rapid response team (WHO),;vaccine safety training (WHO); 
WHO Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety (GACVS); project to support public 
confidence in immunization programmes(LSHTM).
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The most important system component in terms of costs was investigation, which 
accounted for 35% of total costs on average per country (from 14% in Senegal to 68% 
in Mexico). The second largest system component contributor to costs was detection, 
which contributed 27% of costs (from 2% in Uganda to 66% in Brazil). Coordination 
also accounted for 27% of costs on average (from 6% in Mexico to 67% in Senegal). 
Regarding the funding of NVSSs, Senegal and Uganda relied mostly on external donor 
support. By contrast, NVSSs of Brazil, Iran and Mexico had a low donor dependency 
as they were mainly funded by the MOH.
International vaccine safety initiatives costs and funding
The total cost for all IVSIs was US$ 4.3 million. IVSI focused mainly on coordination 
which accounted for the majority of the costs (55%; US$ 2.38 million). Investigation was 
the second most important system component (23%; US$ 1 million). Personnel costs 
(i.e. salaries and per diems) were the main specific cost category of IVSIs at 64% of the 
total costs. Training was the second most important (16%) followed by transportation 
(13%) and equipment (4%). 
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation contributed the largest amount for IVSIs, 
at US$ 1.2 million, and was the most frequent IVSI funder, providing support to 
six initiatives out of the 13. The NRA assessment initiative had the most diverse funding 
sources (12 funders). All other IVSIs relied on between one and four funding sources 
to conduct their activities. The major IVSI funders mostly supported coordination, 
whereas detection, investigation and communication represented a minor share of 
their financial support.
1. Introduction
The goal of the study was to provide data on the cost and funding for current vaccine 
safety systems in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), and international vaccine 
safety initiatives. These data were collected to inform decisions on budgets and funding 
choices for WHO’s strategic plan for enhancing global vaccine safety activities.
The financial assessment sought to provide answers to the following questions.
How much does the current vaccine safety system cost? What are the main cost •	
drivers?
Which of these costs are likely to reoccur each year or to increase following •	
improvements in vaccine safety systems?
How much is spent by vaccine safety initiatives and vaccine safety technical and •	
financial partners worldwide? In which specific areas of vaccine safety do each 
of them invest?
How is the coordination between financing partners perceived by vaccine safety •	
stakeholders?
To what degree do stakeholders perceive funding mechanisms as operational •	
and efficient?
What other funding mechanisms could be proposed?•	
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2. Methodology
2.1 Scope of the study
The period for which costs were considered was the year 2009. The spatial scope included 
11 NVSSs and 13 IVSIs, worldwide. The perspective of the financial assessment was 
that of ministries of health of selected countries and IVSIs (i.e. the main organizations 
conducting vaccine safety activities at the global level).
2.2 Cost calculation methodology and analysis
For cost calculation, three different methodologies were adopted; the ingredient 
approach, the rule-of thumb and the budgeting approach. The ingredient approach 
was chosen based on the assumption that the two cost categories, personnel and 
transportation (shared and specific), were likely to represent the bulk of resources 
used for activities; as such, it needed to be assessed in the most accurate way possible. 
This approach was further justified by the fact that most resources are shared with 
other programmes and that no budget line is available. The rule-of-thumb approach 
was used for overheads or small materials as they were likely to represent a minor share 
of the cost. The budgeting approach was applied for training and equipment of IVSI. 
The exchange rate used was the 2009 annual average rate for the local currency versus 
US dollar currency. No inflation rate was taken into consideration due to the fact that 
the study was conducted during a one-year period.
Costs were calculated by NVSS (and for all NVSS) and by IVSI (and for all IVSI). The 
following costs were provided by the financial assessment:
total costs (by system components, activities, cost categories);•	
average costs per vaccine doses administered, per fully immunized child, per •	
AEFI reported (by system components, activities, cost categories);
shared versus specific costs — to identify which costs are shared with other •	
programmes;
fixed versus variable costs — to identify which costs are likely to increase •	
following improvements in vaccine safety systems; 
recurrent versus capital costs — to identify which costs are likely to reoccur •	
each year. 
2.3 Methodology for the analysis of funding strategies
The funding for vaccine safety was analysed by system component and activities based 
on the opinions of both national and international vaccine safety experts. The following 
criteria were used for the assessment.
Efficiency: a situation where the costs of obtaining and accounting for funds and •	
stimulating efficient vaccine safety activities are minimized.
Capacity to provide resources in a timely manner and in the right place: a situation •	
where resources are available in the desired volume at the right time and at the 
right place to have the greatest benefit for vaccine safety.
Overlap: a situation where the same activities are funded by different initiatives •	
leading to a surplus in funding for those activities (in relation to needs).
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Sustainability: the ability to mobilize and use resources in an efficient and reliable •	
manner to achieve current and future vaccine safety targets.
Accountability: a financing arrangement that is compatible with procedures, •	
and documentation that allows for transparency in the allocation and use of 
funds.
2.4 Data collection
The survey participants for data collection (individuals and institutions) were vaccine 
safety experts identified by the collaborative group. For the countries, the survey 
respondents were the national focal points for the Global Network for Post-Marketing 
Surveillance. For international initiatives, they were the heads of the different IVSIs. 
The questionnaires were sent by email to survey participants, in addition to guidelines 
on the completion of the questionnaire. The preliminary costs calculated were shared 
with the countries’ focal points and IVSIs for their review and validation, and then 
revised accordingly. 
2.5 Study limits
The survey is limited to five countries, as in six of the surveyed countries (Albania, India, 
Kazakhstan, Tunisia, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam) it was not possible to determine the 
total costs for vaccine safety activities. Consequently, due to the limited sample size, the 
total and average transversal costs calculated for NVSSs are only indicative. In addition, 
some of the results of the study (e.g. cost per AEFI reported) are dependent on AEFI 
reporting. As a result, average cost per AEFI can be either under or overestimated. 
The contributions and activities of vaccine producers were not in the scope of the 
financial assessment as the perspective chosen was the one from the Ministry Of 
Health. This perspective might have underestimated resources for AEFI surveillance, 
as some are provided by manufacturers (for activities of post-marketing surveillance, 
characterization and understanding of serious adverse events related to vaccines).
3. Costs and funding of national vaccine safety systems
3.1 National vaccine safety systems total and average costs
Countries identified as having well-established AEFI surveillance systems 
(Brazil, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Mexico)3 had the highest total costs4 in 
comparison to other countries’ systems (Senegal and Uganda). The NVSS total cost 
was US$ 0.9 million in 2009 on average per country (from US$ 10 012 in Senegal to 
US$ 2.4 million in Iran). In 2009, the cost per vaccine doses administered was 
US$ 0.03 on average per country (from US$ 0.0014 in Uganda to US$ 0.0648 in Mexico). 
The cost per fully-immunized child was US$ 0.53 on average per country 
(from US$ 0.01 in Uganda to US$ 1.37 in Iran). Table 1 shows that, without shared 
personnel, the average cost per fully-immunized child falls to US$ 0.09 on average per 
country.
3 See activity 1.5 baseline assessment (structure and management of AEFI system.
4 Three different methodologies were adopted for cost calculation: the ingredient approach (for 
personnel and transportation); the rule-of-thumb approach (for overheads and small material costs), 
and the budgeting approach (for training). Vaccine safety activities were divided into four system 
components (type of activities): detection; investigation; communication, and coordination.
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Among the countries surveyed, low and lower-middle income countries had lower cost 
of their NVSSs. However, a low cost per vaccine administered or fully-immunized child, 
may indicate either an efficient system or an underfunded system, or one that does not 
conduct the required activities. Given that, by far the lowest costs per fully-immunized 
child, occurred in the countries with the least resources, the latter explanation seems 
more likely. The low cost of these NVSSs could imply a need for surveillance capacity 
strengthening (especially in terms of detection and notification activities at the 
health-care delivery level to ensure a proper reporting system). This was the case 
with Senegal and Uganda, where the detection system component accounted for a 
lower share of total cost. Another finding that could suggest underfunded systems is, 
that there seemed to be a common trend between the importance of the cost for detection 
and the number of AEFIs reported.
Table 1: National vaccine safety systems average cost  
per system component in 2009 (US dollars)
SYSTEM COMPONENT
COST PER VACCINE 
DOSE ADMINISTERED 
(US$)
COST PER FULLY-
IMMUNIZED CHILD (US$)
COST PER AEFI (US$)
With 
shared 
personnel
Without 
shared 
personnel
With 
shared 
personnel
Without 
shared 
personnel
With 
shared 
personnel
Without 
shared 
personnel
DETECTION 0.0071 0.0009 0.1677 0.0343 299.32 109.36
INVESTIGATION 0.0133 0.0011 0.2288 0.0265 1362.18 244.74
COMMUNICATION 0.0034 0.0001 0.0609 0.0008 163.38 6.97
COORDINATION 0.0032 0.0007 0.0581 0.0141 283.27 91.60
OTHER 0.0009 0.0007 0.0164 0.0138 113.67 53.61
TOTAL 0.0278 0.0034 0.5320 0.0893 2221.83 506.28
3.2 National vaccine safety systems system components costs
The most important system component in terms of costs was investigation, 
which accounted for 35% of total costs on average per country (from 14% in Senegal 
to 68% in Mexico). The second largest system component contributor to costs was 
detection, which contributed 27% of costs (from 2% in Uganda to 66% in Brazil). 
Coordination also accounted for 27% of costs on average (from 6% in Mexico to 67% 
in Senegal).
A common factor identified between all the countries is the low cost of communication 
in relation to other system components, as communication represented, on average, 
5% of total costs (from 0% in Brazil to 15% in Iran).
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3.3 National vaccine safety systems costs driver (by cost category)
The main costs driver of NVSS is personnel. It represented 81% of the total costs 
on average (from 50% in Uganda to 97% in Iran). Most of these personnel were 
shared personnel working on some other activities — it represented 68% of total costs 
on average (Graph 1) ranging from 38% in Brazil to 94% in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Specific personnel represented 13% of total costs on average per country 
(from 0% in Uganda and Senegal to 54% in Brazil), reflecting the existence in some 
countries of positions dedicated to AEFI surveillance activities. 
Most of the costs of the NVSS did not change with a variation in the degree of vaccine 
safety activities because they were fixed costs (68%). In addition, costs were mostly 
shared (68%) with other programmes, which meant that they were not directly paid 
for (but were funded by other programmes)5.
Graph 1: Distribution of national vaccine safety systems costs,  
by cost category in 2009 (percentage)
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3.4 National vaccine safety systems funding
Regarding the funding of NVSSs, the donor dependency was different between 
countries. Senegal and Uganda mostly relied on external donor support, but, by contrast, 
NVSSs in Brazil, the Republic of Iran and Mexico, had a low donor dependency as 
they were mainly supported by the MOH. National health ministry’s6, in particular, 
supported investigation for 23% of total NVSS funding and detection for 26% on 
average per country. WHO supported coordination at 21% on average per country, 
and this was even higher in Senegal and Uganda.
5 The absence of capital costs is linked to the assumption that no equipment costs are purchased 
specifically for NVSSs.
6 The specific activities from manufacturers in terms of AEFI surveillance were not included in the 
scope of the survey.
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3.5 To go further on national vaccine safety systems results
In absolute terms, and all things being equal, if the vaccine price were raised by •	
US$ 0.03 per dose, the cost of current vaccine safety activities at national level 
would be covered, as it represents the average cost per dose of all the NVSS 
activities conducted (on average per country).
Funding requirements for functional NVSSs could be determined by the average •	
cost provided by the financial assessment representative of existing AEFI 
surveillance systems and, in particular, the average cost per fully-immunized child, 
in relation to vaccine coverage targets in countries (all things being equal). 
It may be preferable to use the average costs of countries with the most effective vaccine 
safety activities. In this case, data from Brazil, as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and Mexico, might be more appropriate.7
4. Costs and funding of international vaccine safety initiatives
4.1 IVSI total cost and system component costs
At the global level, the total cost for IVSIs was US$ 4.3 million. Coordination accounted 
for the majority of the costs (55%; US$ 2.38 million). This, in turn, was mainly driven 
by development of guides and tools (17% of total), committees and meetings (11%) 
and capacity building (6.5%). Investigation was the second most important system 
component (23%; US$ 1 million) and was mostly driven by hypothesis-testing studies 
(14%). Communication accounted for US$ 0.05 million (1%). The distribution of the 
IVSI system components can be explained by the fact that international initiative core 
activities are related to support national AEFI surveillance8. As a matter of fact, the low 
cost share of detection is due to the fact that consultation and notification are conducted 
at national level, where they account, on average, for 27% of activity costs. 
4.2 International vaccine safety initiatives costs drivers (by cost category)
Personnel costs (i.e. salaries and per diems) were the main cost category of IVSI at 
64% of the total costs. Training (including capacity-building activities) comes second 
(16%), followed by transportation (13%) and equipment (4%).
7 As they were identified as having well-established systems by activity 1.5. 
8 According to the results of the SWOT analysis 1.2, IVSI “provide services to the national level 
towards specific goals [...] concern detection to concern validation to hypothesis testing to risk 
communication.”
Global vaccine safety blueprint - The landscape analysis92
Graph 2: Distribution of IVSI costs by cost category in 2009 (percentage)
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4.3 International vaccine safety initiatives funding
The institutions supporting IVSIs financially included: foundations; UN organizations; 
global-health partnerships; national governmental institutions; specialized agencies; 
bilateral agencies; multilateral agencies, and private donors, with a total of 17 different 
funders. Seventy-seven percent of the IVSI funding is provided by four of these 
organizations. The NRA assessment initiative had the most diverse funding sources, 
with 12 different funders. All other IVSIs relied on between one and four funding 
sources to conduct their activities. 
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation was the most frequent IVSI funder, 
providing support to six initiatives and supporting the four types of system components. 
Almost all major funders supported coordination, with the exception of the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, which primarily supports investigation. 
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, WHO and the GAVI Alliance, contribute 10% 
to 20% for investigation and 80% to 90% for coordination.
4.4 To go further on international vaccine safety initiatives results
While IVSIs contributed over US$ 4 million, the findings from individual countries 
indicate how limited this amount is, as it approximates the amount spent by just 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Mexico. The overall amount spent by the different 
organizations that fund IVSI is also tiny compared to that spent promoting vaccines. 
For example, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation contributed the largest amount at 
US$ 1.2 million, for which they are to be commended; however, within the context of 
a multi-billion initiative to develop or introduce new vaccines, this amount is small. 
Even more striking is the amount contributed by the GAVI Alliance, at just over 
US$ 400 000, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
arms of other sovereign governments, in which major vaccine manufacturers reside. 
93WHO/IVB/12.04
One consequence of the small total amount contributed to vaccine safety is that IVSIs 
focused mainly on catalysing vaccine safety systems rather than directly supporting 
or financing national systems. For example, just US$ 104 000 was spent on case 
investigations. By contrast, activities such as capacity building, committees and meetings, 
and development of guides and tools received substantially greater funding.
5. Financing strategies for vaccine safety
5.1 Evaluation of the current funding systems of vaccine safety activities
The assessment of the current vaccine safety funding situation by experts9 is that:
adequacy of funding: vaccine safety is not sufficiently funded. •	
Timeliness of funding: funding for vaccine safety activities was not available •	
at the right time or at the right place (for 60% of the respondents). 
Diminishing budgets, insufficient resources and delays for material and 
budget delivery were reported by survey respondents as obstacles to funding 
timeliness. 
Overlap: there is no overlap in current financing for vaccine safety (for 66% of •	
countries’ experts and 60% for experts from initiatives). 
International experts indicated that increased political will and the sustainability of 
funds are the most important criteria related to success, and hence that these should 
assume priority in developing a financing strategy for vaccine safety. 
This suggests that all types of activities are either in need of financing10 and/or that they 
can absorb additional funding. The other implication is that a financing strategy that 
would reallocate funds from activities already conducted, to others, is not an option 
for the future financing strategy.
The combination of low current funding in developing countries, low funding by 
international donors, and an imperative for countries to implement robust surveillance 
in the future, creates a conundrum. The NVSS and IVSI experts have provided some 
recommendations for moving forward, which focus mainly on strategies for increasing 
funding. Ideally, in the long term, all countries would contribute a sufficient amount 
for national activities.
9 Among the 19 experts contacted to provide their comments on the current financing situation of 
NVSSs and IVSIs, 15 provided answers and recommendations (8/11 from NVSS and 7/8 from 
IVSI). These experts included national vaccine safety experts (national EPI managers, national AEFI 
surveillance managers, etc.) and heads of international vaccine safety initiatives.
10 The need for financing is confirmed by the financial results of activity 1.2 (SWOT+ analysis) that 
indicated an expansion in the planned FTE of 30%.
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5.2 Recommendations for the funding strategy
Recommendations from vaccine safety experts were all oriented towards increasing 
funding. The main ones were: 
to create a dedicated budget for AEFI surveillance;•	
to implement a combination of public and private funds; •	
to explore the feasibility of an excise tax model; •	
to explore the feasibility of a predefined regular contribution managed by WHO •	
or an international regulatory authority.
6. Conclusions
Countries identified as having well-established AEFI surveillance systems 
(Brazil, Iran and Mexico) had the highest total costs in comparison to other systems 
(Senegal and Uganda). In addition, middle-income economies had a relatively 
higher cost of their NVSSs. The main cost category of NVSS was shared personnel 
(68%). The average cost per vaccine doses administered was US$ 0.03 on average 
per country (from US$ 0.0014 in Uganda to US$ 0.0648 in Mexico). The cost per 
fully-immunized child was US$ 0.53 on average per country (from US$ 0.01 in Uganda 
to US$ 1.37 in Iran). At the global level, the total cost for IVSIs was US$ 4.3 million. 
Coordination accounted for the majority of the costs at US$ 2.38 million (55%). 
Investigation was the second most important system component with a cost of 
US$ 1 million (23%).
The results of this study can provide guidance for estimating funding requirements 
for future vaccine safety activities. It must be balanced by the assessment that some of 
the reporting countries were likely to have underfunded systems. Outcome indicators 
for vaccine safety systems are lacking, and make it difficult to judge which systems are 
functioning well with adequate funding. 
For NVSSs, these results indicate the overall contribution and main cost drivers within 
different country contexts, which may help guide financing strategies in the future. 
For example, the main cost category in most countries was human resources. By contrast, 
Mexico, and to a lesser extent the Islamic Republic of Iran, contribute substantial 
resources to communication. Given that a major reason to conduct AEFI surveillance 
is to reassure the public, efforts might be made to encourage countries to spend more 
on communicating results of surveillance to providers and the public. The overall 
costs of AEFI surveillance in more developed economies, such as Brazil and Mexico, 
may also provide guidance on the costs of more robust systems. In order to interpret 
performance of NVSS, it would be interesting in future studies to show the distribution 
of the activities’ costs at the different administrative levels.
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